In recent years there has been a revived interest in Hegel’s view of history. With that scholarly interest, there is a new exploration of the concept of Weltanschauung or worldview.

The following are important extracts as quotations from the literature in chronological order of publication. It starts with Wilhelm Dilthey – who is famously the historiographer who began this intellectual journey in the mid-twentieth century – and ends with Arvi Särkelä’s exploration of the connection of our question here of worldview and the practice of critical theory. There are several papers of Graham Priest who is the very noted logician who has explained the intelligibility of Hegel’s own worldview.
There are philosophical systems which above all others have stamped themselves on the consciousness of mankind, and in which permanent bearings have been found for discovering what philosophy is. Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Comte have created systems of this kind. [page 7]

The edifice which he [Kant] planned to erect in this way was to be based on the truths thus discovered, and in this sense he retained the term 'metaphysics.' He had already grasped even the new principle of content on which Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Fechner, and Lotze established metaphysics.

According to the great insight of the new epistemological philosophy of Locke, Hume, and Kant, the external world is only a phenomenon. Reality is given in the facts of consciousness (for the English thinkers, directly; for Kant, to be sure, conceptually, subject to the conditions of consciousness). [page 16]

Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schopenhauer advanced from the systematic unity of consciousness, and each of them thus discovered his principle of the universe. [page 17]

The ablest thinkers in the first movement, Schelling and Hegel, started with Fichte's proposition that the universally valid, systematic unity of consciousness, manifesting itself in the empirical ego, produces the systematic unity of the universe. This proposition itself was a false interpretation of the facts of consciousness. [page 17]

In restless dialectic, from the intellectual intuition of Fichte and Schelling to the dialectical method of Hegel, they vainly sought a procedure to prove the identity of logical coherence and the nature of things, of the systematic unity in consciousness and that in the universe. [page 17]

But this second non-metaphysical position [sociology] now extends far beyond the field of positivism. Through the subordination of mental facts to the knowledge of nature a Weltanschauung is mingled with positivism, which thus becomes a particular doctrine within the new position. We find the same position widely adopted also without this supplement, and, indeed, by many distinguished scholars in the field of the human studies. In political science and jurisprudence it appears in a singularly effective way. The view of the imperatives which legislation imposes upon the citizens of a state can be restricted to the interpretation of the will expressed in these imperatives, and to logical analysis and historical explanation, without a return to universal principles, like, for example, the idea of...
justice, to support and validate positive law. Such a procedure implies a philosophical position akin to positivism. [page 22]

The conceptual means for inwardly unifying religion and philosophy are the same in all these systems [ancient Greek]. The first is the doctrine of logos. In the divine unity is a power to communicate itself, and so the philosophical and religious forms of communication proceed from God in essential relation. The other means is allegorical interpretation, through which the particular and historical element in religious belief and the Holy Scriptures is raised to a universal Weltanschauung. In the systems themselves philosophical impulse, religious faith, rational proof, and mystical union with the Godhead are so bound up together that the religious and the philosophical processes are presented as aspects of the same process. For in this age of great religious struggle the observation of the development of significant personalities suggests the new creative thought that there is a general type for the genetic history of the more exalted souls. On this thought the highest forms of medieval mysticism are based, so that in them also one may recognize not a mere mixture of these two fields but, for deep psychological insight, their essential unity. The necessary consequence of such a spiritual phenomenon was a complete terminological upheaval. Jakob Boehme calls his life-work a holy philosophy. [pages 28-29]


The author concludes that we cannot choose between Kant or Hegel, the main philosophical mentors of German nineteenth-century evolutionists, but must learn from both. Such a venture would meet the hope of [Ernst] Haeckel to bridge the dichotomy between dualism and monism through a comprehensive monistic view. [page 581]

When we come to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, we notice that he does not distinguish between the noumenal and the phenomenal, since the whole phenomenal realm is witness and expression of God. Though there is a notion of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, through which things or ideas move and have impulse and activity, there is no actual contradiction within the dialectic; it is only a coming back to itself. Thus all objects are not actual objects, but parts of the whole. Consequently one may classify this philosophy of progressive wholeness as a kind of mystic pantheism (Hirschberger:379). We are not surprised that Hegel shows much openness toward a philosophy of nature. [page 583]
Introduction to Hegel on Worldview (Weltanschauung)

As we will see at several points, most of Haeckel's thoughts, however, can be traced back to earlier thinkers, such as Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Leibniz, Feuerbach, and others (Hirsch:590; Zbickler:669). Haeckel's monistic worldview is nothing new, but under the impact of the theory of a uniform evolution, it gains in precision and persuasion. [page 592]

...Haeckel advocates a monistic worldview. The world is made up of one immortal substance rendering itself immortal (1893:24). Of course, according to Haeckel, the immortality of the cosmos makes any personal immortality untenable. [page 593]

Haeckel concedes that one could label this worldview materialism, but he feels the term monism is more appropriate. He does not think that his worldview is atheistic in the strict want to reduce God,'" he declares, knowledge of nature, Small wonder that claims that "among the time have developed most complete is the persuasiveness of developed his philosophy edge, his "system differently. [pages 593-4]

...We can ignore with Haeckel the quest for essence and posit a monistic worldview, though assuming that there might be a "thing-in-itself" behind the world of phenomena. Or we can revert to Kant, distinguishing between the noumenal and the phenomenal. But are our choices limited to an either-or? Did not Haeckel express the hope that the dichotomy between dualism and monism could be bridged in the twentieth century through a comprehensive monistic view? Indeed, we cannot rid ourselves from the understanding that humanity and the cosmos form an inexorable and uniform unity. Humanity is part of nature and in nature. Even in traditional theological terms humanity's hope is not an unworldly one but hope in a new world to come. Yet the dialectic between humanity and world, matter and spirit is not simply a means to propel the evolutionary process, as Hegel assumed. The two poles are not to be merged, either, as the pre-Darwinian materialistic monists claimed. There is also an over against, a behind and a beyond, as Kant suggested. But this differentiation does not diminish the reality of the phenomenal, making it into a projection of the mind, as some idealists claimed. We would then again be confined just to one dimension, the human mind. Evolutionary thought, which gained momentum in the nineteenth century, and which then for the first time could be substantiated on a large scale by the findings of science, has to learn from Kant and Hegel without totally aligning with one or the other. Kant without Hegel tends towards an idealistic vision, while Hegel without Kant tends towards undifferentiated progression. If we are willing to learn from both, we can and must continue to perceive the world in evolutionary terms, without falling into pitfalls of shallow materialism or utopian dialectic. We will be reminded that the noumenal, though endowing the phenomenal with reality, is beyond the reach of empirical investigation, and we will have to learn that the real progression of history does not come from the movement of matter, but of the spirit. [pages 596-7]
Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true, or that some things are both true and false. It is a rather heretical view, and one at which people are liable to balk. When meeting dialetheism for the first time a person is likely to be struck by two questions: 'What reasons could there be for believing that?' and 'How is it even possible for something to be both true and false?' I will attempt to answer these questions in that order. Though heretical, dialetheism is a view that has been espoused by a minority of philosophers in the history of philosophy (and probably Eastern philosophy too). The most obvious example is Hegel, who held that contradictions could be realised in many situations. I am aware that this literal interpretation of Hegel is contentious, but since Hegel exegesis is not on the agenda here, I shall not stop to defend it. [pages 99-100]

Coming to believe in dialetheism is as difficult, I think, though no more so, than these [theories such as Special Theory of Relativity]. In fact, the number of philosophers who have consciously believed explicit contradictions is much larger than the contemporary teaching of philosophy would lead one to expect. There are, to name but a few: Heraclitus, Plotinus, Nicholas of Cusa, Hegel and Engels. [page 103]

In particular, Hegel's and Marx's dialectics is based on dialetheism. With the benefit of historical hindsight we may not, perhaps, find this overwhelmingly surprising. For no one before this century tried harder than Hegel to think through the consequences of thought thinking about itself, or of categories applying to themselves. And this is just the kind of self-referential situation that gives rise to the logical paradoxes. [page 388]

Despite this, it is very necessary in a contemporary argue that dialectics is dialetheic. Prima facie, dialetheism is an open-and-shut case. For example, of Logic (1969) Hegel says (in this and all italics are in the original):

> . . . common experience . . . says that . . . there is a host contradictory arrangements, whose contradiction exists reflection, but in themselves. (440.)

And asserts boldly a few lines later:
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External sensuous motion is contradiction’s immediate moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another one and the same moment it is here and not here, because once is and is not.

Yet many, if not most, interpretations of Hegel assert that where Hegel talks of contradiction, and even asserts one, he must be understood as meaning something else. For example, Acton (1967a, 444): Hegel did not regard formal logic as a philosophical science, and he therefore rejected any view that its categories should dominate philosophical thought. Thus, the fact that the word "contradiction" is used in a certain way by formal logicians was not for him a reason for confining himself to that meaning. When Hegel was advocating the dialectical method, he had in mind a method in which opposites, conflicts, tensions and refutations were courted rather than avoided or evaded. [page 389]

Hegel distinguished, quite rightly, between dialectics and formal logic - which was for him the Aristotelian logic of his day. The law of non-contradiction holds in formal logic is correctly applicable only in a limited and well-defined area (notably the static and changeless); in dialectical logic, which applies in a much more general domain, the law of non-contradiction fails. Subsequent dialecticians accept Hegel distinction. But formal logic has now matured into modern Frege/Russell logic. This is immensely more powerful than syllogistic, and has brought the science of reasoning to age. Whether or not justified in doing so, most modern dialecticians – East and West - see Frege/Russell logic as giving a definitive account of the most abstract norms of correct and scientific thought. Dialectical logic, whatever else it is, must at least be compatible with this, which, of course, rules out dialetheias. Thus Hegel’s and Marx’s rejection of the law of non-contradiction, and, consequently, their notion of contradiction, have had to be interpreted non-literally, on pain of a charge of being unscientific or of irrationalism. (For the former see, e.g., Colletto, 1975, 28. For the latter see Norman, in Norman and Sayers, 1980, 50.) [page 391]

Nor has the supposed significance of modern formal logic been lost on anti-Marxist writers. While defenders of dialectic have been doing their best to explain that Hegel and Marx did not mean what they said, Popper (1940, 317; see also Acton, 1967b, 392), with characteristic charity, assumed mean what they said, and used this some baby logic to reduce dialectics ... it can easily be shown that if one were would have to give up any kind of scientific breakdown of science. This can be shown by statements are admitted, any statement whatever contradictory statements any statement whatever Thus, modern dialecticians, most of whom know little formal logic, have allowed themselves to be intimidated, and even brow beaten, into reinterpreting dialectical contradictions. [pages 391-2]

...Marx’s dialectic involves a somewhat radical re-interpretation of Hegel’s, and certainly has a rather different emphasis. But structurally, it is very similar. We may, as in Hegel, distinguish between the global dialectic and the two local dialectics, logical and historical.
Under the influence of Feuerbach, the young Marx reinterpreted Hegel's *Geist* as Man or, better, humanity. Hegel's global dialectic therefore became the dialectic of humanity. To be a person is to have a certain *telos*, which is self-development. This is to be achieved not by thinking, but by working, labor. But the labor alienates itself and comes to exist in contradiction to people. ... [page 405]

Despite the re-interpretation, the similarity with Hegel is obvious. Moreover, as in Hegel, the alienated state is literary a the contradictory one. Humanity, $h$, while still being humanity $h=h$, loses its essence ("species life"), becomes dehumanized. Thus humanity is not humanity, $h \neq h$. Marx sometimes makes the point not with respect to humanity, but with respect to its essential, defining, characteristic: labor. For example he says (1977, 110):

 Estrangement [Alienation] is manifested not only in the fact that my means of life belongs to someone else ...but also in the fact that everything is itself something different from itself - that my activity [labor] is something else --...

Of course, the labor is still my activity; otherwise it would not be different from itself. Thus the labor is both identical to itself and different from itself: $(l=l)\&(l\neq l)$.

The most important structural difference between Hegel's and Marx's dialectics for the present concern is that in the final stage of Marx's dialectic the resolution of the contradiction actually removes it; there is no contradiction between labor and capital in a communist society. [page 406]

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[Priest/Mackenzie addresses Popper’s misunderstanding in footnote]

See, for example: For we find only too often that dialecticians, when in logical difficulties, as a last resort tell their opponents that their criticism is mistaken because it is based on logic of the ordinary type instead of on dialectic; if they would only use dialectic, they would see that the contradictions which they have found in some arguments of the dialecticians are quite legitimate (namely from the dialectic point of view).

Popper, 1940: 328-9.

See also Popper's discussion of the first of the elements he finds in Hegel's dialectic, under "(a)", p. 327, and his criticisms in § 3, p. 334, of the use of dialectic "following the example of Engels' *Anti-Duhring*" to defend Marxism in a way which undermines "the anti- dogmatic attitude once so strongly supported by Marx and Engels", p. 335. Like Popper, and like Marx
and Engels as he presents them, we believe that there can be no worse obstacle to the growth of science than a reinforced dogmatism. [page 355]


ABSTRACT: The philosophical past, once a thing of the past, is with us again. I examine three recent positions about how to understand the philosophical past: the presentism of Richard Rorty, the traditionalism of Alasdair MacIntyre, and the interpretism of Charles Taylor. Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor all acknowledge a Hegelian influence upon their views; thus, I also explore Hegel's own view of the history of philosophy. Finally, I offer my own view that our relation to the past ought to be guided by "recognizing" it. Although the concept of recognition is found in Hegel, I argue that Hegel as well as Rorty and MacIntyre end up conceiving of our relation to the past as one of appropriation. Recognition as I define it eschews such appropriation; rather, it consists in a "working through" of the past in a sense the paper specifies. [page 163]

The philosophical past, once a thing of the past, is with us again. A change has taken place in the philosophical world: no longer are there many philosophers who simply dismiss the importance of the past. Moreover, there is a noteworthy trend toward increased respect for the history of philosophy, although this ought not imply that a consensus is emerging among philosophers. Perhaps the most perspicuous assessment of the present is that philosophers have begun to examine anew their relation to the philosophical past. [page 163]

*Philosophy in History*, a volume published from a lecture series at Johns Hopkins University, contains several essays which exemplify the renewed interest in examining questions about how philosophers ought to regard the past. I shall focus on three positions, represented by the contemporary philosophers Richard Rorty, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. My intention in presenting these three distinct positions is to address the complexities involved in defining oneself in relation to the philosophical past; ultimately, I contribute a position of my own. [page 163]

Rorty, MacIntyre and Taylor concur in some respects about the philosophical past. They agree that the question of our relation to the past needs to be raised anew, and, more specifically, that in embracing the past we should be mindful of the extremes of antiquarianism and anachronism. All three note a precedent for their views in Hegel. Indeed, it is worth emphasizing that each of these three distinguished philosophers occupies a unique but parallel position in the philosophical world. [page 163-4]
None of these philosophers fits neatly into either the analytic or continental camp. All three are well-versed in the analytic style of philosophy and have made bona fide contributions to it. One can discern an abiding admiration for the rigor of analytic philosophy in their work. But their sympathies lie more with continental philosophy—at least in terms of the underlying motivation of their work. Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor have broken away from old, ideological attitudes that inform philosophical orientation, thus opening up new paths for philosophers.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Rorty, MacIntyre and Taylor coincide in their appreciation of the history of philosophy. Yet, on closer examination, there are also major differences among them. Rorty’s view can be termed “presentism,” since it entitles contemporary philosophers to be guided by self-justification and thus privileges the present in relation to the past. MacIntyre’s view can be termed “traditionalism,” since it grants authority to the past, while it also proposes that the past can serve as a guide for the present. Taylor’s view is more difficult to characterize: I shall call it “interpretism,” as it emphasizes that the past is contained in the present and thus that examining the past is a means of self-understanding. Although Taylor’s view is self-consciously the most Hegelian, each of the authors has a distinct sense of what a Hegelian view entails.

The first three sections of this paper cover the positions of Rorty, MacIntyre and Taylor, respectively. In the fourth section, I consider more directly and substantively what a Hegelian view of the history of philosophy means. My interpretation of Hegel’s view serves both as a way of clarifying the Hegelian underpinnings of Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor and as an introduction to my own view of the history of philosophy as “recognizing the past.” Moreover, turning back to Hegel himself moves the discussion from an abstract consideration of how to do the history of philosophy to an actual test case.

In the fifth section, I assess the Hegelian influence on Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor and then discuss this influence as guided by a model of appropriating the past. In the last section, I develop my own view of recognizing the past. My view is influenced by Hegel and his contemporary interpreters. However, I attempt to chart a course between Rorty’s presentism, which is cavalier in its treatment of the past, and MacIntyre’s traditionalism, which errs on the side of adulating the past. “Recognizing” the past means “working through” it. Through recognition the past can be a source of self-understanding, as Taylor suggests ‘a la Hegel. However, it does not involve, unlike these Hegel-inspired versions, appropriating the past, assimilating the alienness of the past to our own needs.

It is at the level of Weltanschauung that it is possible to discern that rival theories are "moving toward what can be specified ... as the same goals" (43). But how is it possible to establish that one theory is preferable to another? [Alasdair] MacIntyre’s answer reveals why access to the past is so crucial. He claims that a theory might be considered superior “by providing from its own point of view a better explanation and understanding of the failures, frustrations and incoherences of the other point of view (failures, frustrations, and incoherences, that is, as judged by the standards internal to that other point of view) than
that other view can give of itself" (47). In this view, the history of science is no less sovereign over science than the history of philosophy over philosophy. Neither science nor philosophy can dispense with its own past because then there would be no way to justify the present.


*Reason and Revolution* holds the important distinction of being the first book to appear in English. In addition, it was the first systematic published Hegel's major works from a Marxist standpoint in any language, preceding years those by Georg Lukacs ([1948] 1975) and Ernst Bloch ([1949] 1962). *Reason and Revolution* stands as one of the major Marxist treatments of Marx's work as grounded in Hegel's concept of dialectic. Theoretically, Marx's presented not only as a critique of capitalism, but also, at least implicitly, for a critique of Stalinist Communism. Marcuse's book contains a critical Hegel's major works, such as the *Phenomenology of Mind*, the *Science of Logic*, the *Philosophy of History*, and the *Philosophy of Right*; it also includes treatment in English of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. This Hegelian-Marxian heritage is counterposed to what Marcuse considered to be essentially conservative worldview of positivism, which teaches people "to view phenomena of their world as neutral objects governed by universally valid (1944, p. 326). [page 244]


This article argues that postmodern approaches to anthropology typically display certain characteristic logical errors and are based on questionable assumptions about human thought and desire. Further, the liberationist moral stance taken in postmodern discourse tends towards the excesses diagnosed by Hegel as 'the law of the heart'; that is, a romantic solipsism that ignores the ambiguity and limits of human existence. The moral and theoretical problems of postmodernism are linked to the anomie of contemporary society, which presses beleaguered intellectuals towards the use of interpretivist modes of thought. The article concludes by questioning the emancipating potential of postmodern theory that places imagination at the centre of anthropological inquiry, and argues instead for a reconsideration of the fundamental constraints and potentials of the human condition. [page 748]
In this article, I will follow in this debunking tradition, using material from a few typical articles by recent anthropological practitioners of postmodernism to outline some of their characteristic arguments. Then I will show some logical quandaries that are implicit in these claims. This is straightforward enough, but what I wish to do next is perhaps more unusual; that is, to consider the moral stance implicitly or explicitly presented by these theorists. This has ramifications that are problematic in the extreme, as I will show, relying primarily on Hegel’s (1967) dissection of ‘the ‘law of the heart’ for my critique. Next, I employ Durkheim’s concept of anomie as a key to an understanding of the source of the postmodern trend in anthropology, and conclude by calling into question the liberating potential of a theory that places imagination at the centre of the anthropological endeavour. [pages 747-8]

The postmodern claim: One standard argument made by postmodernists opposes the ‘essentializing’ of categories - especially the categories used by anthropologists in their study of culture. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Lindholm 1995), this radical critique of traditional anthropology has been taken to its logical end-point by Abu-Lughod, who proposes that the very notion of culture should be discarded, since its use must inevitably make these ‘Others’ seem simultaneously more coherent, self-contained and different from ourselves than they might be ... This in turn allows for the fixing of boundaries between self and other (Abu-Lughod 1993: 7).

She argues further that the self-other distinction will always be hierarchical because the self is sensed as primary, self-formed, active, and complex, if not positive. At the very least, the self is always the interpreter and the other the interpreted (Abu-Lughod 1993: 13).

Influenced deeply by the anti-imperialist and anti-Orientalist writings of Said (1979), Abu-Lughod suggests that it is destructive, oppressive and wrong to typify other persons as having a distinct cultural heritage which can be studied, grasped and compared, or even, it seems, to imagine others as separate from ourselves. Instead, she calls on anthropologists to write against generalization and to reveal, through multiple narratives, how ‘people strategize, feel pain, contest interpretations of what is happening - in short, live their lives’ (Abu-Lughod 1993: 14). Narrative accounts of ordinary existence are better - more true and more moral - than any theoretical formula or comparative claim. [page 748]


The philosophical figurehead of the book is Hegel, the one philosopher who in Priest’s view drew the appropriate conclusion from a range of arguments resulting in contradiction: that
those contradictions are genuinely true. It is interesting, however, that Priest does little of substance with Hegel other than raising him up for brief praise. [page 720]

The whole thesis of limits of thought is of course Kantian in tone, and it is a treatment of Kant and Hegel that forms the second section of the book. Priest gives Kant’s antinomies a thoroughly critical treatment, finding both their formulation and Kant’s attempts at solution generally unsatisfactory. In Kant's behalf, however, Priest supplies a Fifth Antinomy which he does regard as successful. Whether it owes nearly as much to Kant as to the contemporary construction of the ordinals is another question… [page 720]


ABSTRACT: Hegel's interpretation of Plato's political thought provides the principal illustration of his metaphilosophy. However, Hegel has been criticized for imposing his own metaphilosophical agenda upon Plato's work, and for consequently overestimating its descriptive content while underestimating its prescriptively normative features. A reexamination of Hegel's metaphilosophy nevertheless reveals that he appreciated the broader significance of Plato's political philosophy within a conceptual framework that transcends the traditional dichotomy of description and prescription and that explores issues concerning the relation of theory and practice. [page 288]

Because philosophical self-consciousness is the product in an existing mode of life, it cannot erase those difficulties a dying culture, but it can, and necessarily does, lead to the birth form. Since this self-consciousness initiates the movement from of development to the next, the comprehension of the aging important part in the transition to that which follows. The project of bringing these problems to the surface is the first practical process of resolving and transcending them. Thus the dichotomy of description and prescription is inapplicable metaphilosophy. Because of the reciprocal interconnection between historical transformation and self-consciousness, practical prescription begins when philosophical description draws attention, albeit inadvertently, to limitations inherent in the existing order (Hegel 1975, 56). [page 292]

Self-consciousness with regard to one stage begins the transition next. Knowledge plays an important role in this process since from which a higher form emerges, while the preceding spiritual both preserved and transformed within it: "This progress when the national spirit destroys itself by the negativity because its knowledge, its thinking apprehension of being is matrix from which a new form and indeed a higher form, whose conserves and transfigures it - emerges" (Hegel 1975, 61). [page 292]

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Thus, while the achievement of philosophical self-cannot rejuvenate the old actuality, it can do much to anticipate inspire its successor. For insofar as he grasps the spirit philosopher also reveals the limitations that are the cause, decline and of its transition to the next; and insofar as its decline and of its inherent limitations, a philosophy may serve as much to indicate the general direction of subsequent development response to these limitations. It is these problems with which the subsequent vision must grapple, and the philosophical view resulting contradictions of the earlier epoch will tend to retain its prominence throughout the gestation of the next historical phase. As the candidate worldview begins to take shape, its recognition will depend on its capacity to encompass and propose solutions to this same set of problems. Yet the full articulation of this subsequent vision is the work of the age which follows; it is not a task of philosophy. Because philosophy draws its content only from the preceding age, it can no more than provide an indication as to the general direction of this development. A utopian philosophy is therefore a contradiction in terms: to the extent it is not philosophy but fiction. [page 292]


ABSTRACT: Hegel's political philosophy gives prominence to the theme that human beings have a need for recognition of those qualities, characteristics, and attributes that make them distinctive. Hegel thus speaks to question whether human rights law should recognize and accommodate the nuances of individual make-up. Likewise, he speaks question whether human rights law should be applied in ways that sensitive to the cultural contexts in which it operates. But Hegel's political philosophy evaluates norms and practices within particular cultures by reference to the higher-order and universal criterion abstract right. In light of this point and the inadequacies of political philosophy that privileges local norms and practices, a third approach to the protection of human rights is canvassed. This approach prioritizes neither universal nor local norms. Its aim is to ensure both human rights and the cultures in which they are applied are seriously. [page 554]

... On the reading of Hegel offered by John Rawls it takes the form of subjective alienation. Individuals fail to understand that the social world before their eyes is a home that can accommodate them in a variety of ways. [page 560]

While some may approach life tentatively, others seek simple certainties. In earlier ages, religion and nation, for example, yielded values, goals, a worldview that could be embraced with unqualified enthusiasm. But liberal society calls for compromises. Individuals are
expected to be tolerant. In some circumstances, they are expected to embrace and positively value otherness. Hence, the narrow horizons of pre-liberal society must be given up. But some yearn for a less accommodating and less complicated set of practical arrangements, within which they can single-mindedly pursue 'the cause', whatever it may be. Moreover, some may give expression to such commitment in a form that can be explained by reference to Carl Schmitt's writing on politics. For Schmitt, politics is essentially conflictual and takes the form of a struggle between friends and foes (the latter being 'the other' or 'the alien'). Relevant here is Douzinas's discussion of those who, in contemporary society, give their support to a football team and, thereby, seek to invest their lives with meaning. Strong commitment to the cause is typically manifested by (and expected of) those who identify themselves as supporters. For they see themselves, and are regarded by fellow supporters, as members of a 'tribe'. And, in some cases, such support can slide towards profound intolerance of otherness (for example, 'goading a player for his race'). Where this happens, the liberal state is confronted by impulses it cannot accommodate and some, at least, find themselves inhabiting a social world that is not their home. [page 560-1]


The second striking fact about the tables of contents [several early twentieth century philosophical journals] is that, setting the psychological papers aside, there is one tradition of philosophy that predominates: German Idealism, and specifically Kant and Hegel. There are several articles on these two philosophers and their ideas; and several written by or on well known Anglo-Hegelians of the time, like Bradley and McTaggart. There is therefore no doubt about what dominated philosophy at the turn of the century. [page 90]


Abstract: This article makes a case for intersubjective recognition in Hegel by examining the idea of a 'struggle for recognition' in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Challenging the argument by several scholars that Hegel eventually came to compromise his initial interest in intersubjectivity, it argues instead that Hegel allots a central place to the idea of a 'struggle for recognition' at least in the Phenomenology of 1807. To substantiate this thesis, Hegel's phenomenological exegesis of 'Conscience. The "beautiful soul", evil and its forgiveness' is reconstructed in terms of a 'struggle for recognition'. The final section questions the further
claim of some of these critics that Hegel's thought came to rest on a metaphysical concept of an Absolute Spirit, ultimately undermines interpersonal relationships. [page 262]


ABSTRACT:

Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), unlike her later books, is centrally concerned with the nature and fate of the modern state. The book presents a series of political pathologies - antisemitism, imperialism, tribalism, and totalitarianism - that Arendt regards as the result of failures in the state's dual mission to integrate diverse social groups into a single body politic, and to uphold the uniform rule of law for all. Her underlying conception of the state bears a striking, though unacknowledged affinity to that of Hegel. Like Hegel, moreover, she argues that citizens' mutual recognition of one another's human rights, as mediated through state institutions, is an indispensable condition for full human self-consciousness and agency. Her version of this argument is developed first through an excursus on the origins and effects of racism among Europeans living in Africa, and then through an analysis of the unique plight of stateless refugees. [page 106]


Abstract: After locating postmodern philosophy in terms of its opposition to the quest for certainty in Descartes and Hegel and commenting briefly on its secular character, the article considers Jean-François Lyotard's critique of modernity's metanarratives and Heidegger's critique of onto-theology. The argument is a) that these critiques (and by implication other postmodern critiques) are not conceptually linked to atheistic contexts in which they are found, b) that they can be read as unintentional commentaries on the Christian doctrines of Creation and the Fall and thus on human finitude and fallenness, and c) that when recontextualized in this way these critiques can serve as guides to personal and corporate self-examination, both theoretical and practical. [page 845]
Hegel shares these ideals [of philosophical uncertainty] but has his own distinctive version of how they are to be achieved. Thus 1) certainty is to be achieved not through methodological doubt but through the ontogenetic recapitulation of the phylogenetic pathway of doubt and despair that is traced in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. 2) Clear and distinct ideas are not immediately at hand but become available only through a thoroughgoing critique of the categories of thought such as we find in the Science of Logic.

3) While beginning in the right way is important if philosophy is to be un-conditioned by the contingencies and particularities of history, Hegel has learned from Kant (and Spinoza) that only that is unconditioned which includes the totality of conditions. The juxtaposition of completeness with certainty and clarity in Kant's Preface to the First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is ominous from Hegel's perspective. [page 846]


ABSTRACT: Reading Hegel's 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion alongside his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, I argue that his vision for becoming a self-conscious subject – or seeing (oneself as) "spirit"-requires taking responsibility for the insight that every act of reason expresses an experience of sexual difference. It entails working to bring into being communities whose conceptions of gender and the absolute realise this idea. [page 120]

23. In "Culture" and again in "Morality" the rational male fails to appreciate how his self-consciousness is the place in the community where the ethical substance of that community-its laws, values, worldview, and the like -lives, finds expression, brokers criticism, and evolves in response to past and present sufferings and new challenges. In Culture, he perceives the world of legal right as "something external, the negative or self-consciousness" (PS ?484, 294). In Morality, he again revisits the anguish of unhappy consciousness, experiencing the absolute as over and against himself. [page 145]
Rorty’s “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin”: It is this bifurcationist worldview presented by those critics of Dewey’s naturalistic ethics, and their quest for a foundation that Rorty wishes to rebut. Rorty attempts to reconcile a tension between Hegel and Darwin evident in Dewey’s naturalistic view of growth. On the one hand, because of his Hegelian background, Dewey does not give final authority to natural science despite his commitment to the scientific method. On the other hand, he is “sufficiently naturalistic” to think of human beings in Darwinian terms. [page 24]

Dewey is “a pragmatist without being a radical empiricist, and a naturalist without being a panpsychist.” Based upon this interpretation, Rorty supports the implications of Dewey’s naturalism for his American democratic vision in terms of his antimoralism and antiauthoritarianism—pragmatism’s revolt against a bifurcationist’s worldview. Dewey carried with him a “lifelong distaste for the idea of authority—the idea that anything could have authority over the members of a democratic community save the free, collective, decisions of the community.” This is founded on Dewey’s naturalism, “a metaphysic of the relation of man and his experience in nature.” Rorty compares Dewey’s vision of democracy to Whitman’s “democratic vistas”—the significance of natural human experience, “something that can be loved with all one’s heart and soul and mind.” Unlike Plato, with his idea of “eros,” or Kierkegaard with his concept of the “Wholly Other,” but not unlike Nietzsche and his “polytheism,” Dewey brings the authority of the moral life back to humans on earth, “an indefinitely expansible pantheon of transitory temporal accomplishments, both natural and cultural.” [page 24]

… The logic is simple, albeit fallacious: if methodological individualism ("atomism") is untenable, then moral individualism must be as well. Thus is the baby disposed with the bath water. [page 660]

There is a certain irony to this, not least because Hegel viewed "freedom of subjectivity"--individual freedom--as "the principle of the modern world." He judged any political constitution that did not institutionally recognize this fact as "unacceptable." 3 But -- at the same time--Hegel devoted an enormous amount of philosophical energy to correcting what he saw as a misleading and false picture of social reality (one born of Hobbes and the social contract tradition, and given wider currency by the utilitarian social philosophies of the
Enlightenment. He made this effort less because he was obsessed with *method* than with the character of our self-understanding. To misconstrue the relative priority of language, laws, institutions, and practices vis-à-vis the individual was not merely to stand the social world on its head, mistaking the effect for the cause. It was to *deprive oneself and one's society* of the possibility of ever achieving genuine freedom. Considered as a stubbornly persistent worldview, individualism seemed to condemn Western culture to the pursuit of a phantom freedom—the freedom of individual self-assertion or self-sufficiency. [page 660]

Hegel, then, saw the methodological presuppositions of modern Natural Law and utilitarianism as symptoms of a deeper, historically and culturally rooted, misunderstanding of our place in the world. This misunderstanding, he argued, fundamentally distorted the nature of our moral and political experience. Thus, while Hegel can with some justice be blamed for setting the pattern by which epistemological-methodological argument substitutes for (or bears the brunt of) cultural critique, we need to keep one thing very firmly in mind. Unlike many of his inheritors, Hegel insisted on making a distinction between subjectivity (which he saw as the great achievement of the modern age) and subjectivism (which he saw as an increasingly dangerous moral and methodological fetish). 6 Hegel's clear grasp of this distinction enabled him to appreciate the moral political achievement of modernity—individual liberty—while simultaneously mounting one of the most powerful critiques ever made of individualism qua worldview. On this score, he bears a striking resemblance to Tocqueville—their massive dissimilarities (regarding the nature of the state, civil society, and democracy—to say nothing of sheer style of thought) notwithstanding. [page 660-1]

In this essay, I want to look at Hegel's indictment of individualism, contrasting it with Tocqueville's more limited, but in many ways parallel, critique. My hope is that bringing these two disparate thinkers together will not only illuminate the origins of what has become a reflexive intellectual tendency, but will also clarify what is at stake—morally and politically speaking—in any responsible critique of individualism. [page 661]

As Tocqueville observes, if "aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king," democracy in effect "breaks that chain and severs every link of it." This is the "natural" result of a "democratic social condition," and it was as real in America (despite the absence of aristocratic structures to break up) as it was in Europe. The form of consciousness—the state of mind or worldview—denoted by "individualism" accurately represents this condition of modern, "democratic" dissociation. But, as Tocqueville points out, this form of consciousness also blinds us to the myriad ways we continue to depend on one another. It obscures the "close tie" between our private interest and the public good. [page 670-1]
'What is philosophy?' is a question that every professional philosopher must ask themselves sometimes. In a sense, of course, they know: they spend much time doing it. But in another sense, the answer to the question is not at all obvious. In the same way, any person knows by acquaintance what breathing is; but this does not mean that they know the nature of breathing: its mechanism and function. The nature of breathing, in this sense, is now well understood; the nature of philosophy, by contrast, is still very much an open question. One of the reasons this is so is that the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophical question, so uncontentious answers are not to be expected—if philosophers ever ceased disagreeing with one another our profession would be done for. (More of this anon.) Moreover, it is a hard philosophical question. Many great philosophers, including Plato, Hegel, and others, suggested answers to it. But their answers would now be given credence. In the thirty or so years that I have been doing philosophy there have been two views about the nature of philosophy which have had wide acceptance. These are the views of the later Wittgenstein and of Derrida. In the first two parts of this paper I will describe these views and explain why I find them unsatisfactory. I will then go on, in the final part of paper, to outline a view that inspires more confidence in me. [page 189]

All that 'philosophy' as a name for a sector of culture means is 'talk of Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Russell ...and that lot'. Philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition—a family romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida. [page 198]

[Footnote Seven] The two account of philosophy we have looked at have another feature in common, too: each depends on another substantial philosophical theory—about meaning in both cases. This feature is not uncommon in accounts of philosophy: Plato's account of philosophy depended on his theory of forms, Hegel's depends on his theory of Geist, and so on. Maybe one cannot escape this dependence sometimes, but it is clearly better if an account of philosophy does not depend on another substantial philosophical theory: such a dependence makes the account unhappily hostage to fortune. The account of philosophy to be described in this section will not have this problem either. [page 200]
Abstract: This essay advances the concept of transversality by drawing philosophical insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Calvin O. Schrag, and the Martinicuan francophone Edouard Glissant. By so doing, it begins with a critique of the notion of universality in modern Western philosophy. It targets Hegel—the modernist incarnate—in particular, who had a dark view of the non-Western world. His overarching Eurocentric universality is founded on the fallacious premise that what is particular in the West is universalized or universalizable, whereas what is particular in the non-West remains particular forever. As Glissant puts it succinctly, however, thinking about "One" is not thinking about "All" or "Many." Eurocentric universality is outmoded and thus has no place in the globalization of the multicultural world. It simply ignores the reality of interlacing of multiple life-worlds. The concept of transversality, which is symbolized in the Maitreyan Middle Way, is proposed to replace universality, which tends to be nothing but the philosophical expression of a particular socio-cultural life-world. It not only reduces ethnocentric ignorance but also fosters a hybridity that in fact dissolves the binary opposition between particularism and universalism. In short, transversality is conceived of as a new paradigm in philosophical conceptualization or world philosophy. What is traditionally called "comparative philosophy" is not just a neglected branch of philosophy, but it is poised to transform radically the very conception of philosophy itself. [page 416]

Hegel's succession of sublations "finalizes" itself in the identity of identity and difference. Bakhtin’s dialogical principle, based on Dostoevsky's poetics, is "unfinalizable," that is, it has no ending. Not only is there neither first nor last word but also every past meaning has its homecoming festival. Speaking of Dostoevsky, Bakhtin writes forcefully:

[A]t the center of Dostoevsky's artistic worlds must lie dialogue, and dialogue not as a means but as an end itself. Dialogue here is not the threshold to action, it is the action itself. It is not a means for revealing, for bringing to the surface the already ready-made character of a person; no, in dialogue a person not only shows himself outwardly, but he becomes for the first time that which he is—and, we repeat, not only for others but for himself as well. To be means to communicate dialogically. When dialogue ends, everything ends. Thus dialogue, by its very essence, cannot and must not come to an end. At the level of his religious utopian worldview, Dostoevsky carries dialogue into eternity, conceiving of it as eternal co-rejoicing, co-admiration, concord. At the level of the novel, it is presented as the unfinalizability of dialogue. [page 426]
Introduction to Hegel on Worldview (Weltanschauung)


BRIAN LLOYD

ABSTRACT: Pragmatism, as understood by John Dewey and celebrated by contemporary Deweyans, was forged in the crisis World War I. As much concerned with national unity as was the Committee on Public Information, it is stamped by the anti-German impressions as moved ordinary citizens to harass German Americans. Dewey bowed to these pressures by removing Hegel from the leading role he actually played in his own development and allying himself with William James, even as he maintained his distance from James' philosophy. Following Dewey's lead, historians have continued to misrepresent the main contours of American intellectual development by casting pragmatism as a variety of empiricism and, as such, natural complement of a non-ideological civilization. By this act, both the founder of modern historicism and the ideologues have shaped American history have been banished from most accounts of American historical thinking. [page 489]


... What is our guiding sense of self and how does it guide our actions? As epistemological subjects we occupy center stage in our worldview and field of vision. Around us we see nothing but objects with which we deal by applying concepts to them; that is, we name and define them and thereby fix them in their respective positions. In Sartre's telling expression, we are 'the masters of the situation.' And as long as we cling to this perspective, the logical way to deal with other people is the like way: we assign them a place in our field of vision and treat them as objects. In Mou's view, Western philosophy has internalized this perspective to a degree that even ethical reflections take it as their starting point, but he insists that the truly ethical perspective is the reverse one: we are the addressees of the Other's call for help/respect/assistance/attention/recognition. We are responsible. [page 273]

According to Mou's Confucian view, the problem with this—apart from the entirely unintelligible notion of a divine creator of the universe—is that the basic moral qualities of man do not fit into the purely human realm as defined (i.e., limited) by the Christian dogma. For morality, correctly understood, is something that transgresses into the realm that the
Christian worldview has labeled 'divine' and hence off-limits for human beings, which means that under the dogmatic restrictions imposed on philosophical thinking by Christianity no understanding of man as a moral being in the full sense of the term could arise. If I understand Mou correctly, he thinks that even Kant’s seemingly technical transcendental distinction is basically a fruit of the cultural soil out of which it has grown.


ABSTRACT: The term ‘realism’ and its contrasting terms have various related senses, although often they occlude as much as they illuminate, especially if ontological and epistemological issues and their tenable combinations are insufficiently clarified. For example, in 1807 the infamous ‘idealistic’ Hegel argued cogently that any tenable philosophical theory of knowledge must take the natural and social sciences into very close consideration, which he himself did. Here I argue that Hegel ably and insightfully defends Newton’s causal realism about gravitational force, in part by exposing a fatal equivocation in the traditional concept of substance, by criticizing some still-standard empiricist misconceptions of force, by emphasizing the role of explanatory integration in Newtonian mechanics, and by using his powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference to justify fallibilism regarding empirical justification, together with the semantic core of Newton’s Rule Four of (experimental) Philosophy—in a way that highlights a key fallacy in many arguments against realism, both in epistemology and within philosophy of science.


Abstract: There are two traditions of immanent social critique. One of them, prominent in contemporary Frankfurt school critical theory, regards the immanence of critique as a quality of the standard employed. Such a conception of immanent critique needs to show, prior to the concrete practice of critique, how the standard is immanent in the object of critique. Showing this is the task of a “model of immanent critique.” The other tradition, going back to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and practiced in particular by Dewey in his later works, regards the immanence of critique as the form of critical practice itself. Because such a conception of immanent critique does not, at the outset, ask how the standard is immanent to its object, it also does not need a model licensing critical practice. Indeed, it...
must be inherently hostile to any attempt at modeling immanent critique because the immanence lies in the power of critical practice to transform any models it applies. [page 218]

A positive account of immanent critique as self-transformative practice would need to stress the vigorously social nature of critical practice. A model seems necessary for measuring the success of critique, if nothing else, for distinguishing mere opinion from warranted assertions. Yet such claims of universality can only be achieved in a practice understood as “social,” as Dewey calls it, or “spiritual,” as goes the Hegelian term. Such a social practice of self-transformation involves a division of labor in what Hegel calls “subjective,” “objective,” and “absolute spirit.” They all come to life in the observing and recording “we” that is thematized time and again as Dewey and Hegel are practicing immanent critique: this “we” of critical practice involves an organic division of labor as it is differentiated into (a) the author of critique (Dewey, Hegel, any “subjective spirit”), (b) the public (the co-critics and the institutionalized “ethical life” or “associated living” they represent), and (c) the absolute spirit as the community of artists, scientists, philosophers, and so on, that is, any critical communities dissociating themselves from the given institutionalized ethical life in order to mediate between the common sense, the counterintuitive worldview of science, and emancipatory hopes (LW 3). What individual critics need are the “map” of preceding co-critics, the “compass” of emancipatory values, and an understanding of their own practice as one of drawing a new map of the “way of despair” (PoS, §78) through the “province of criticism” (LW 1, chap. 10). As spatial constraints prohibit dwelling on this social pattern of the practice of immanent critique, I will confine myself to concluding that there are not one but two traditions of immanent critique: modelism and experimentalism. [pages 227-8]