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The Concept of the Level Playing Field¹

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Every idea, word, term has a fit, in that we can measure some meaningful signal from when a person uses an idea, word, or term to explain their own beliefs. It has become fashionable in all quarters to nastily dismiss a proposition where someone is attempting to explain an idea, word, or term, and this is to deny any meaningful content in the thinking offer. This is absolute cynicism and should not be accepted in society, but provided as the meaning of a *moronic* thinking, and not to be *hypocritical*, each must admit that, to some measure, it is performed by each person sometime past. It is an emotional reaction of human development and society agrees it is a stage of immaturity; although most of us keep falling intermittently for this emotional trap.

At this stage there are still uneven attempts at a fair dialogue. There needs to be an understanding at further stages of cognition. Cognition is, in simple terms, the art of knowing, but in *the full semantic* (an explanation of meaning): *cognition* is “mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses”. What this means is that thought and passion (emotion) are held together. At this stage we are holding thought and our emotional reaction as a whole, and not pursuing “rabbit holes” of too narrow thinking: the parts devoid of relations to holistic meaning. Originally the term “rabbit holes” meant a psychedelic experience (known colloquially as a trip) is a temporary altered state of consciousness induced by the consumption of a psychedelic substance (most commonly LSD, mescaline, psilocybin mushrooms, or DMT). However, the term has become to mean a non-psychedelic experience with the same perceptual outcomes: visual distortions and a subjective loss of self-identity, sometimes interpreted as mystical experiences. There is still legitimate

¹ [Wikipedia](#) is used for the definitional valuing of all terms used in this paper. Sentences of *Wikipedia* are often deliberately and legitimately ‘copied and pasted’ to provide accuracy, however, in some cases the *Wikipedia* definitional sentences have been modified for legitimate meaning in the paper.



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semantic fitness in this term. A mystical experience is a genuine phenomenon to which we can speak as experiential knowledge.

That is the first clarification of what happens with the thinking in an idea, word, or term. Two further stages are required: frameworks, and finally concepts. A conceptual framework is an analytical tool with several variations and contexts. It can be applied in different categories of work where an overall picture is needed. It is used to make conceptual distinctions and organize ideas. Strong conceptual frameworks capture something real and do this in a way that is easy to remember and apply. There are different types of frameworks:

- Working hypothesis – exploration or exploratory research
- Pillar questions – exploration or exploratory research
- Descriptive categories – description or descriptive research
- Practical ideal type – analysis (gauging)
- Models of operations research – decision making
- Formal hypothesis – explanation and prediction

With the exception of the first, working hypothesis, across these types are the meta-reflection types of non-privileged claims and privileged claims. As a legal term, *privilege* is a rule of evidence that allows the holder of the privilege to refuse to disclose information or provide evidence about a certain subject or to bar such evidence from being disclosed or used in a judicial or other proceeding. It has a legitimate fitness as a starting point in the conversation or dialogue, but it goes wrong when the conversation or dialogue goes no further than this starting point. Particular privilege claims can be challenged or/and defeated as a piece of correct reasoning. This goes to the need for a ‘level playing field’, explained further on. But first one has to understand what a concept is. A concept is defined as an abstract idea. It is understood to be a fundamental building block underlying principles, thoughts, and beliefs.

Concepts play an important role in all aspects of cognition. As such, concepts are studied within **multidisciplinary** areas of linguistics, psychology, and philosophy, and, as disciplines, have separate logical and psychological structure of concepts, and often speak at cross-purpose on how concepts are put together to form thoughts and



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sentences. This is the confusion which has to be untangled in meta-reflective (**multidisciplinary**) *conceptual analysis* and reassembled story-telling (**history**). Conceptual analysis is also referred to, more generally, as the **analytic tradition** (characterized by a clarity of prose; rigor in arguments; and making use of formal logic and mathematics, and, to a lesser degree, the natural sciences), in order to "break down" (i.e. analyze) philosophical issues. Arguably the most prominent of these techniques is the analysis of concepts (known as **conceptual analysis**).

A **level playing field** is a concept about fairness, not that each person has an equal chance to succeed, but that they all play by the same set of rules resulting in formal equality of opportunity. The original argument in this paper is a consideration of how the concept of the level playing field is the antithesis of the stagnated positioning of the privileged claim.

Semantics and Strategies for the Level Playing Field

A level playing field is a space. It is a space for a conversation between one person and another, and the number of others. It is often **seen** (quietly believed; often masked) as **not** particularly important. *That is the fundamental error.* A level playing field is a communication space that is even in relationship between whatever number of players are participating. The communication could be binary but it would be easier to be even if more players are participating. There is a size with the number of players, where mass becomes evident, and there is again a challenge to the evenness of the communication. In talking about 'player', it is **not** to suggested that that the communication is ideally inauthentic. Quite the opposite is being said. Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning, examines what meaning is, how words get their meaning, and how the meaning of a complex expression depends on its parts. There are genuine meaning and fitness to all ideas, words, or terms.

So, every word in this piece of writing is deliberately being used. Using the word, 'player' is only to suggest that models of sociology, psychology, history, and, indeed, philosophy, are being used. A 'model' is an informative representation of an object, person or system. As representation, **it has no concrete tangibility or value.** *It is the application of the representation, the model, that produces the tangibility or value.* If I **say (only), and only**



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for example, “Jesus Christ”, I have introduced a representation, or *the model*: if I am inferring a system of belief (the model). At this point, there is no tangibility, and whatever valuing there is from the speaker. it is **not yet apparent**. Thus, with further semantics, further conversation, the model of belief can be **actualised** into something, eventually, tangible and highly valued. The semantics of the concept, “level playing field,” is highly political and is valued as such. The concept is a challenge to our hierarchical ways of thinking. Now before I go further, it must be **noted this is not a binary conversation**.

I am **not** saying the choice is strictly between an equalitarian outlook and an authoritarian outlook. What I am saying is, **unless** we have positioned ourselves (each) on the most **extreme** point on the spectrum, our thinking – for each – will be some mixture, and some different weighting, in the semantics of fairness (or evenness) and authority (or deference). If we can understand the **wisdom** that each ancient idea – understood in modernity – has a place in a life, then there is **no absolute binary choice**. These values are actualised in a context of a thought, or as Hannah Arendt pointed out, *a human condition actualised*. This is the **authenticity** we need in actualising the “level playing field.” The problem, or challenge, is the highly political valuing. What this produces are strategies. The concept of “Strategy,” used by corporate marketing is highly political. Partisan politics – the politics of parties, collections of organised political players – is not the only type of politics. If we are honest, **we are political** in our conversation, even with the those we love dearly. Politics is conventionally “activities that are associated with making decisions in groups, or other forms of power relations among individuals, such as the distribution of resources or status.” But that is complex definition. It is easier to understand ‘politics’ as “forms of power relations,” resizing the conventional definition.

Strategy is conventionally said to be “a general plan to achieve one or more long-term or overall goals under conditions of uncertainty.” If we are honest with each other, that is what we do in regular conversations. **Unless** a conversation is simply **nonsense**, and that is mundanely possible and actual, **we each will have a purpose for a conversation**; that is, a goal of what each wishes to get out of the conversation. There is almost always uncertainty where the conversation will head and where it will arrive (if it does arrive). Thus, each educated person has actually been taught to stratify while they each listen and speak. We call that the “dialogue” with the dialectic model. A dialogue is simply “a written or spoken conversational exchange between two or more people.” A dialectic refers to people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to arrive at the truth through reasoned argumentation.



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Our advocates in the allegedly “post-truth” era “**assert**” that the reasoning process is no longer possible; but to ‘asset only’ creates a **solo-thinking mind** of no importance. It is the position of the idiot. A wise person understands that even as everyone disagrees on some point of alleged ‘truth’ that there also many ‘truths’ confirmed between many persons. So, as a philosopher-historian, I am saying the idea of a “post-truth era” is a **falsehood**. The assertion cannot be sustained in any intelligent dialogue. The asserter who remains the asserter is defined as a contrarian: “A person who likes or tends to express a contradicting viewpoint, especially one who denounces the majority persuasion, usually because of spite or **nonconformity**.” There is a place for the idea and practice of ‘nonconformity’. But nonconformity merely for the sake of nonconformity is not wisdom, but being “a pain in the butt.”

So, our second challenge is one of authority, a power or right to make or enforce rules or give orders; or a position having such power or right. **Equalitarian thought needs to have authority if it is to work**; thus, not *everything* is even. Disaggregated contrarians cannot disrupt the process for egalitarianism, simply by asserting disagreement. Unless they (each) re-enter with reasoned dialogue, they each have made their lives irrelevant; and that is their individual choice and right. This is what it means to be **anti-social**. So, articulating and actualising the “level playing field” will require a respectful measure of *deference* (“legitimate influence of one's superior or superiors”). There are experts and expertise, and being a contrarian will never change that. An expert is somebody who has a broad and deep understanding and competence in terms of knowledge, skill and experience through practice and education in a particular field or area of study. That is singularly meant as “superior” and nothing more than this in the semantics. Someone is an expert, which means that they are not always correct but have a **better probability of being correct**, and respected to this exact measure – and ‘exact’ since experts do disagree on technical points, but also agree to the measure of the scoping.

Thus, in the “level playing field” conversation we each are not completely agreed on the question of what is means to be ‘human’ or what it is to have a philosophy of ‘life’ (*Lebensphilosophie*). However, there is much which will be agreed upon in the conversation. This then is a demonstration of the “level playing field.”



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Equality of Principle and Equality of Opportunity

The liberal (tradition) framework had played heavily on the concept of 'Equality of Opportunity' to which the radical (tradition) framework has brought forth criticism and critical thinking. 'Equality of Opportunity', or ...

Equal opportunity is a **state of fairness** in which individuals are treated similarly, unhampered by artificial barriers, prejudices, or preferences, except when particular distinctions can be explicitly justified. For example, the intent of equal employment opportunity is that the important jobs in an organization should go to the people who are most qualified – persons most likely to perform ably in a given task – and not go to persons for reasons deemed arbitrary or irrelevant, such as circumstances of birth, upbringing, having well-connected relatives or friends, religion, sex, ethnicity, race, caste, or involuntary personal attributes such as disability, age. According to proponents of the concept, chances for advancement should be open to everybody without regard for wealth, status, or membership in a privileged group. ([Wikipedia](#))

Fairness has many meanings:

Fairness or **being fair** can refer to:

- [Justice](#): in particular, [impartiality](#), [objectivity](#), and decisions based on [merit](#)
- The character in the award-nominated musical comedy [A Theory of Justice: The Musical](#).
- [Equity \(law\)](#), a legal principle allowing for the use of discretion and fairness when applying justice
- [Social justice](#), equality and solidarity in a society



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- [Distributive justice](#), the perceived appropriateness of the distribution of goods, benefits, and other outcomes in a society, group, or organization (see also: [teleology](#))
- [Procedural justice](#), the perceived appropriateness of rules or procedures used to allocate goods, benefits, and other outcomes (see also: [deontology](#))
- [Interactional justice](#), the perceived appropriateness of interpersonal treatment
- [Environmental justice](#), the perceived appropriateness of the use or treatment of the environment or people via the environment, typically as a function of interpersonal or international relations
- [Fairness measure](#), metrics to quantify the fair distribution of resources
- Perceptions associated with the [ventrolateral prefrontal cortex](#) and [superior temporal sulcus](#) brain regions, in the case of [procedural justice](#), and the [anterior cingulate cortex](#), [anterior insula](#), and [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex](#), in the case of [distributive justice](#)
- Fairness, absence of bias in specific realms:
 - In American broadcasting, presentation of controversies in accord with the [Fairness Doctrine](#).
 - In computer science, [fairness](#) is a property of [unbounded nondeterminism](#).
 - In computer science, and specifically in machine learning, [fairness](#) is a desirable property of algorithms to avoid [bias](#).
 - In network engineering, access to resources formally rated by a [fairness measure](#)
 - In game theory, abstract principles for achieving [fair division](#)
 - In economics, relation among economic factors where price matches [fair value](#) that is (not only bias-free but also) rational
- Fairness of human pigmentation, [relatively light coloring, especially of skin](#)
- [Beauty](#), the original meaning of the word
- Being fair, property of motion of a batted baseball that qualifies it as a [fair ball](#)



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- [Sportsmanship \(Wikipedia\)](#).

The argument here is that there should never be a particular selection (narrow thinking) in the semantics for the “level playing field”. All of these *further* concepts, related to the ‘concept of fairness’, are valid and historical starting points (‘privileged claim’), but **not** a valid privileged claim in a conversation or dialogue which is **open**; open to learning.

How the Playing Field Got Uneven?

Contrary to popular imagination, sub-fields in the university disciplines are mostly **not** comprehensive. Academic fashion, following the trends in the public marketplace, dominate production – topics written and research, and publication outputs.

Academics in the fields of Sociology of Education and Urban Sociology, have noticed this pattern, and these academics are usually the ones at the global cutting edge; in thinking these matters through a meta-reflective landscape. Meta-reflections on higher education have emerge as a cottage industry through diverse groupings of the scholarly literature.

Historians talk about “historical delay” and it is challenging to get this message through: that our social understanding in fields, like Sociology of Education and Urban Sociology, are outdated and very misleading from misinformed models of education.

Educationalists have a nasty habit of chasing the latest “thing.”

It seems that old paradigms are recycled, differently in the choice of research topics and publications. What is lost in the spiral is comprehension. The higher education policies of the last 30 years have grossly narrowed the curriculum to the concept of “job-readiness.” The irony being that no one can be “job-ready” in that framework of narrow thinking.



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The Australian Context for the Level Playing Field

We are all citizens in agreement on the common principle for the State and the Public sharing the economic weight in *fairness* ([source](#)). Unfortunately, most politicians have never had the opportunity for an education in a university classroom of philosophy to **fully** understand what the concept of fairness means according to [Martha Nussbaum](#) and [Helena Rosenblaatt](#), rather than the narrow and populist reading of [John Rawls](#).

What would it mean to be fair in Australian higher education policy ([source](#))? To be able to answer this question the reader needs to go to the philosophy literature to unpack the semantics of *fairness*. Using a research method of working the literature in chronological order, the following is a literature review on the topic and concept, of fairness:

Broome (1984) untangles the problem of consequentialism for understanding fairness: “I shall explain in a moment, that ‘social’ preferences do not obey the sure-thing principle, which is generally taken to be an essential requirement of rationality.” In doing so, and as my assessment, the critique of the sure-thing principle makes a nonsense of the (reductive) ‘unnecessary commitments’ claims for utilitarianism. The necessity of the calculation can be seen as perjurious from the defeat of the sure-thing principle for preferences; as preferences can never be completely true, and the otherwise-claimed testimony has sourced in some false information. Thus, Broome has two-part argument on fairness:

1. even granted that equalising people’s utilities is a way to be fair, that is no reason to think equalising expected utilities is.
2. even granted the fairness of random selection on appropriate occasions, this fairness is not captured by valuing equality in expected utilities.

The issue here is the negativity, we don’t know what we don’t know. Only very tight contextual descriptions might provide an *adequate* basis for a political “calculation”. In time, though, most political calculations are shown to have missteps. Constant reviews of logical steps combined with the *acceptance/room* for *fallible* human action will



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provided the very tight contextual descriptions that would provide an adequate basis for a political *judgement*, not a numeric calculation. Here fairness can be achieved as a *parameter*.

Klosko (1987) helpfully unpacked the ethics of John Rawls and [H. L. A. Hart](#). He shows that the obligations of the fairness principle generate widespread and familiar attitudes toward political obligation, but its formulation as *ethics* is problematic. [Bernard Williams](#) resolved the issue in the distinction between moral obligation and ordinary, or political, *obligation*. The former is a problematic ethical formulation, the latter is normative.

Neal (1990) brings out the wider historiographical and political philosophy issue, an almost impossible binary between the Political and the Metaphysics, which in most applied situations is false. The general conclusion from Neal is that Rawls' approach can work in political discourse but only with further structural work in the JAF concept, which goes beyond the normative use/abuse of the fairness concept. By early 1990s Klosko (1993) took on Rawls head-on: "I criticize both Rawls's general claims about the role of political philosophy and his particular defense of the principles of justice." Rawls' general claims is an argument around well-known principles of justice which can serve in a capacity for an overlapping consensus. Klosko is pointing to a rather different overlapping consensus that appears to contribute to stable democracies, a larger moral framing than the utilitarianism of Rawls. Fairness, in many technical senses, is at the heart of this wider project.

Martha Nussbaum (1993) discussed in a completely different and much more hostile context than most in the law and public affairs, where it is normative to expect leniency. The emphasis here on **plausibility** ('leniency') is on the cognition connections are not often understood. This is often wilfully so: **wilful ignorance**. The players **do not want to know** in their emotive reactions.

Hooker (1995) argues that the normative understanding of *fairness* gives us no reason for thinking a maturely-developed Rule-Consequentialism is inferior to **Contractualism**. This is a technical argument over ethical theories. The point here is a debate over the fairness doctrine where the public has grossly misread the technical arguments. In the



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United States during the 1980s Smith (1999) applied an ideological approach to communication strategies in a “Campaign to Repeal the Fairness Doctrine” for government funding and public policy. This has great significance for Australia. The same communication strategies were applied in the Australian governmental bureaucracies, meaning too few can today have a *fuller* understanding of fairness.

By the turn of the century the law was forced to catch up in the conceptual problem of fairness. Carr (2002) explains that unfortunately a false binary was created in public opinion in the choice of one school of theory. Carr stated: “...I think fairness concerns give rise to an obligation, holding against acknowledged citizens only, to consider whether they should or should not obey the laws of their polity provided they are confident that their polity qualifies as reasonably decent.” Ryan (2006) provided the history lesson on the concept of fairness, going back to David Hume. It is the necessary history lesson which, up to now, the political class has failed to understand, but it is a flawed lesson. From Hume, one school of philosophers see normative acts of praising and blaming as expressive and not descriptive. Hart developed this school of thought significantly, seeing ethics as non-obligatory, replaced by the obligation of the law. In this Bernard Williams followed Hart, but broke at certain stage of thinking on moral responsibility. In the philosophy of language Williams followed Wittgenstein on the *conditions of linguistic uncertainty*. This goes beyond Humean *expressivism* and Hart’s legal ethics. The way we normatively *express* a moral or an ethic is always *uncertain* in the language of morality and the law. The point for this essay is that such *obligations* cannot establish fairness as a general ethical principle. Fairness *ought not* be conflated with obligation. The two concepts *might* be contextual related, but that needs sufficient explanation.

The concept of obligation has been particularly problematic in the liberal tradition. [Helena Rosenblatt](#) (2007; 2008) is the intellectual historian who has unpacked the history of liberalism for its virtues, flaws, and missing elements in practice. She has done extraordinary work in dissecting the key thinkers of liberalism and the missteps in thinking for national religion. Fairness is *often* (but **not always**) tied to religious beliefs. One of Rosenblatt’s major contributions is to draw out missteps in the futile debate between the natural-birth and cosmopolitan visioning of nationalism. Behind the public ‘fairness’ discourses are these misconceptions.



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Martha Nussbaum (2018) adjoins Rosenblatt and opens up an explanation of the different schools of liberalism in the late 20th century. Nussbaum declared her subscription to the school of “Political Liberalism” which has its leadership in Rawls and [Charles Larmore](#). The approach is structurally singular, compared to and in opposition to — according to Nussbaum’s argument — Isaiah Berlin’s and Joseph Raz’s “Perfectionist Liberalism”. This latter school of thought is also a “Moral Pluralist” and “Autonomous” Liberalism, with Raz emphasizing pluralistic valuing and personal (autonomous) action. In my work I do not think that Nussbaum has described the positioning of Berlin and Raz well. Berlin was not as perfectionist in his doctrine of liberalism (drawing on Kant’s “crooked timber”), and Raz’s conception of valuing does give a singular framework to an otherwise pluralistic landscape. All of these conceptions mentioned shaped the public perception of “fairness”, and, again, populist misunderstandings abound from matters of technical debates. These technical debates have unfortunately extended into other futile ‘separation-type’ debates: Enlightenment versus Counter-Enlightenment; Tradition versus Natural Science.

These futile ‘separation-type’ debates are known to intellectual historians as making a mess in the tangled world of religion and secularity, particularly for the Protestant tradition, which I have spent a lifetime unpacking (see also Rosenblatt 2016, 2018; Nussbaum 2018). It is what is missing in the Australian conversations on public practice of liberty and fairness.

This, by no means, is restricted to ‘academic’ knowledge ([source](#)). Recently, David Pindar wrote a blog on a Substack site, called, “Aargh! (Age-activated rage)”. These blog articles are a good mixture of ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ opinions. Recently, I thought his regular piece, “Happy Friday #22”, was particularly good, on 9 March 2024. It highlighted the way Duncan Ivison (Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Sydney) wrote on Jürgen Habermas and discourse theory in *The Conversation* [piece](#) on the 12 March. Mr. Pindar gave me permission to reproduce his blog ([source](#) here). Pindar’s blog article brings out the point that there is philosophical compatibility between rights and fairness for *the public marketplace*, but it takes reasoned political compromise to achieve the results *intelligently*. Everyone should have a secured place in society but it will not necessarily be comfortable. Comfort comes from accepting the reasoned political compromise.



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Ideologically the challenge to philosophical compatibility are worldviews on capitalism and its economic alternatives, and on the principles of fairness, justice and liberty ([source](#)). Ideologies — major belief systems — prioritizes certain principles over other principles. This is the conflict. But what if there was not the system of partisan prioritization, but a system of balancing out the concerns of a democracy. Trumpism, although it is agreed upon by a quarter of Americans, is a choice against a system of compatibility. For **Trumpers**, practical expression in the United States is to see such a democrat hope for social compatible, or the ideal of a civil society, as an impractical ideal. Instead, for trumpers, the country has the ideal of hyper-competitive “entrepreneurship”. But are the American money-markets that entrepreneurial? This is, ironically, the argument of many of Trump’s followers, trying to find riches in alternative currencies. Again, on the Left or Right, the uneducated masses follow the pipedream, like lemmings leaping off a cliff. Get-Quick-Rich schemes have its practical expression in Australia. But it is off-set by an Australian national mythology of “fairness”.

The philosophical compatibility for civil rights is difficult to achieve. Some philosophers will argue that is because of the “civil rights” narrative, and a better narrative is not about constitutional rights at all, but on human nature and the respect for all life forms. There are political truths in this counter-argument, but the history has gone too far to reject the “civil rights” narrative, which is, in fact, the practical expression in the United States. Much less so, it is the practical expression in Australia, which nostalgically looks to the British common law tradition. Rather than judicious rights, an Australian perspective is to fairness in common sense. Nevertheless, across the globe, there are **no boundaries** – conceptual nor geographical.

As one distant geographical boundary, The Brisbane Southside History Network (BSHN) has the exciting opportunities of being able to train students in professionally-based community history, and to help students see ideas of social justice and inclusion, the values of equity and fairness, being practiced from the profession of local history ([source](#)). The idea of value – social justice, equity, fairness, non-discrimination through tolerance and multiculturalism – was implicit in the formation of the discipline in the middle of the twentieth century, in the United Kingdom. The ideas of origins, growth, and decline are charged with value from the perspective of ethical theory. Furthermore, the factors of past lifestyles and the surrounding environmental context are evident in local history work.



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Concluding Remarks

Concluding is only that *you* acknowledge the truths in this essay:

1. Every idea, word, term has a fit, in that we can measure some meaningful signal from when a person uses an idea, word, or term to explain their own beliefs.
2. At the earliest stage of conversant thinking, there are still uneven attempts at a fair dialogue. There needs to be an understanding at further stages of cognition.
3. The first clarification of what happens with the thinking in an idea, word, or term are two further stages of frameworks, and finally concepts.
4. Concepts play an important role in all aspects of cognition. As such, concepts are studied within **multidisciplinary** areas of linguistics, psychology, and philosophy, and, as disciplines, have separate logical and psychological structure of concepts, and often speak at cross-purpose on how concepts are put together to form thoughts and sentences.
5. A level playing field is a concept about fairness, not that each person has an equal chance to succeed, but that they all play by the same set of rules resulting in formal equality of opportunity.
6. A level playing field is a space. It is a space for a conversation between one person and another, and the number of others. It is often **seen** (quietly believed; often masked) as **not** particularly important. *That is the fundamental error.*
7. Using the word, 'player' is only to suggest that models of sociology, psychology, history, and, indeed, philosophy, are being used. A 'model' is an informative representation of an object, person or system.
8. **Unless** we have positioned ourselves (each) on the most **extreme** point on the spectrum, our thinking – for each – will be some mixture, and some different weighting, in the semantics of fairness (or evenness) and authority (or deference).



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9. **Unless** a conversation is simply **nonsense**, and that is mundanely possible and actual, **we each will have a purpose for a conversation**; that is, a goal of what each wishes to get out of the conversation.
10. Our advocates in the allegedly “post-truth” era “**assert**” that the reasoning process is no longer possible (first challenge in the conversation); but to ‘asset only’ creates a **solo-thinking mind** of no importance. It is the position of the idiot.
11. Our second challenge is one of authority, a power or right to make or enforce rules or give orders; or a position having such power or right. **Equalitarian thought needs to have authority if it is to work**; thus, not *everything* is even. Disaggregated contrarians cannot disrupt the process for egalitarianism, simply by asserting disagreement. Unless they (each) re-enter with reasoned dialogue, they each have made their lives irrelevant; and that is their individual choice and right. This is what it means to be **anti-social**.
12. Someone is an expert, which means that they are not always correct but have a **better probability of being correct**, and respected to this exact measure – and ‘exact’ since experts do disagree on technical points, but also agree to the measure of the scoping.
13. In the “level playing field” conversation we each do not completely agree on the question of what it means to be ‘human’ or what it is to have a philosophy of ‘life’ (*Lebensphilosophie*).
14. **Fairness** has many meanings and this what is meant in the meaning of ‘Equality of Opportunity’.
15. Particular selection (narrow thinking) in the semantics for the “level playing field” leads to misplaced privileged claims.
16. The ‘concept of fairness’ are valid and historical starting points and are the ‘privileged claim’, but a *privileged claim* is not **valid** in a conversation or dialogue which is open; open to learning.
17. Contrary to popular imagination, sub-fields in the university disciplines are mostly **not** comprehensive.



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18. We are all citizens in agreement on the common principle for the State and the Public sharing the economic weight in *fairness*.
19. Using a research method of working the literature in chronological order, the understanding is there in a literature review on the topic and concept, of fairness. To ignore it, is **wilful ignorance**.
20. The philosophical compatibility for civil rights is difficult to achieve within rhetoric of the 'level playing field', but not impossible.
21. There are **no boundaries** – conceptual nor geographical – for **us** coming together in agreement on the level playing field.



*Understanding history is
philosophy in practice*



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