The Power Elite and American Wealth on Tuesday 5 November 2024⁩

The Power Elite and American Wealth on Tuesday 5 November 2024⁩

“Who, after all, runs America? No one runs it altogether, but in so far as any group does, the power elite.”

C. Wright Mills (1959). The Sociological Imagination, Oxford University Press. p. 31.

 

 

 

Mills’ The Power Elite thesis (1956) has sustain the length of time to the present. I have said it before. We have never really escaped the paradigms of thought laid out in the mid-century: from hard to soft fascism, to inflationary capitalism, from science fiction totalitarianism, to insane consumerism.

 

 

 

Mass society has never learnt from its mistakes. In The Washington Post today (September 19, 2024 at 6:00 a.m. EDT), journalists Rachel Lerman, Julie Zauzmer Weil, Emma Kumer and Clara Ence Morse, tell us “how rich each candidate is compared with the average American.” The Cognition history of American politics has played out in Mills’ more perceptive “elites versus anti-elites” narratives. The irony is that Mills and his academic associates, the historians Richard Hofstadter, Frank Freidel, and Ken Stampp, were seen to form both a Conflict historiographic school of thought, and it is rival, a Consensus historiographic school of thought. From the standpoint of the early 21st century, it is nonsense; the stupidity of mid-century polemics, as we today the stupidity of polemics. Trying to box the mid-century historians was, and is, stupidity. At the time, Hofstadter complained he disliked the term ‘consensus historian’ several times, and criticized Daniel Joseph Boorstin for overusing the consensus and ignoring the essential conflicts in history (Rushdy 1999: 129; Kraus and Joyce 1990).

 

 

 

Mills (Buch 2022d). was strongly influenced by pragmatism, specifically the works of George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and William James, and added to pragmatic-paradigmatic thinking was Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen, Max Weber and Karl Mannheim, with a dose of Neo-Freudianism. It is stupidity to box-in thinkers.

 

 

 

The work of these American historians and sociologists are very distinct from modern American conspiracy theory. Mills’ The Power Elite (1956) is clearly based on what he claimed as “The Sociological Imagination (1959). It was a positive move because the thinking challenged a structural functionalist approach to sociology, as it opens new positions for the individual to inhabit with regard to the larger social structure. The crossover conflict-consensus dialogue debunks — if any person bothers to read and think — the stupidity of the beloved false ‘dismissals’ of the hard materialists; those who are only interested in profiting themselves, and “screw” everyone else.

 

 

 

Narratives of elites versus anti-elites tie together the global themes of thinking from circa 1950 to the present: egalitarianism, anti-intellectualism (against powerful institutions perceived to be controlled by elites), populism, and the political theory of pluralism (Buch 2022e). Although these are global themes the way of thinking creeps into decision-making at the local level (Buch 2023a, d, h, i, k, l). It has been a substantive argument (Buch 2022a, b; 2023c, f; 2024b) of the author-writer-scholar in the last seven and half years, and five days, since my lover-lifepartner-wife passed on the 17 December 2016. But who listens? It is a cutting-edge theory of historiography (Buch 2022c; 2023b, e; 2024a). But who listens? The work addresses contemporary and global educationalist theories (Buch 2023g, j).

 

 

In conclusion is what I have already stated, but who listens?

 

 

 

The American national mythology, as we review Richard Hofstadter (1955, re-issued 1988; 1963;1965; rev. edition, 2008), Susan Jacoby (2008), and Russell Jacoby (1987; 1999; 2005; 2011; 2020), can be seen as another answer, and, in fact, the all-encompassing problem Ideal. Here the problem is how the ideal is misunderstood, unhistorical. A better historical understanding shows that history is not myth; and persons are making decisions to be wilful ignorance. There is another part of the problem Ideal. In being misunderstood, the myth is not practiced. Donald Trump and J.D. Vance are not practicing the American national mythology as in its historical intentionality. The American state militias were never meant to become a permanent military force to defend state rights; least of all its violent rhetoric and its violent historical incidents.

 

 

REFERENCES AND BACKGROUND RESEARCH

 

 

I acknowledge the use of phrases from Wikipedia entries cited (hyperlinked). I annual donate to Wikimedia.

 

Barrow, C. W. (2007). Plain Marxists, Sophisticated Marxists, and C. Wright Mills’ “The Power Elite.” Science & Society, 71(4), 400–430. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40404441

 

Bell, Daniel (1960). The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in The Fifties, New York, The Free Press.

 

Bell, D. (1958). The Power Elite-Reconsidered. American Journal of Sociology, 64(3), 238–250. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2773191

 

Bourke, Paul (1976) Politics and ideas: The work of Richard Hofstadter, Historical Studies, 17:67, 210-218, DOI: 10.1080/10314617608595548

 

Brown, David S. (2006). Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography, University of Chicago Press.

 

Buch, Neville (2022a). How are we learning? The Intellectual Failure of History and Heritage in Australian Capital Cities, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/how-are-we-learning-the-intellectual-failure-of-history-and-heritage-in-australian-capital-cities/

 

Buch, Neville (2022b). Regarding Our Education Systems Needing Thinking in Contemporaneous Compatibilist Epistemology, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/regarding-our-education-systems-needing-thinking-in-contemporaneous-compatibilist-epistemology/

 

Buch, Neville (2022c). Explaining Neville’s Historiography (Dr Neville Buch ABN 86703686642), Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/explaining-nevilles-historiography-dr-neville-buch-abn-86703686642/

 

Buch, Neville (2022d). C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite, the Old-New Left, and Queensland lived Ideologies, Dr Neville Buch ABN: 86703686642, September 6, 2022.

 

Buch, Neville (2022e). The United States Tour: American Educationalist Models in an Australian State 1942-2022, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642),

https://drnevillebuch.com/the-united-states-tour-american-educationalist-models-in-an-australian-state-1942-2022/

 

Buch, Neville (2023a), with Kath Feeney, Afternoons, ABC Local (ABC Brisbane), 25 July 2023, 9.30 minutes. On naming Brisbane.

 

Buch, Neville (2023b). Research Note: Anglo-American Major Belief-Doubt Systems, Dr Neville Buch Academia.edu, https://www.academia.edu/104984588/Research_Note_Anglo_American_Major_Belief_Doubt_Systems

 

Buch, Neville (2023c). Persons, Ideology, and Cognitive Mapping, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/persons-ideology-and-cognitive-mapping/

 

Buch, Neville (2023d).  2023-04-05 Letter to Mayor. Re. Questions on 2023-2025 Commemorations, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/2023-04-05-letter-to-mayor-re-questions-on-2023-2025-commemorations/

 

Buch, Neville (2023e). Dr Neville Buch’s Philosophy and History, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/dr-neville-buchs-philosophy-and-history/

 

Buch, Neville (2023f). Stupidity of the Market Economy in Higher Education, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/stupidity-of-the-market-economy-in-higher-education/

 

Buch, Neville (2023g).  Communication, Critical Thinking, Education, and Research: A Society Captured in the ‘PR’ Outlook, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/communication-critical-thinking-education-and-research-a-society-captured-in-the-pr-outlook/

 

Buch, Neville (2023h). Letter to the Queensland Government and Heritage Council,  Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/letter-to-the-queensland-government-and-heritage-council/

 

Buch, Neville (2023i). SBSF Submission as Feedback on Kurilpa Sustainable Growth Precinct, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/sbsf-submission-as-feedback-on-kurilpa-sustainable-growth-precinct/

 

Buch, Neville (2023j).  Part Three: Urban Rebellion and Community Education, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/part-three-urban-rebellion-and-community-education/

 

Buch, Neville (2023k). The Southern Brisbane Suburban Forum Inc.’s Briefing-Submission on the State Government’s South East Queensland Regional Plan 2023 Update (SEQRP),  Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/the-southern-brisbane-suburban-forum-inc-s-briefing-submission-on-the-state-governments-south-east-queensland-regional-plan-2023-update-seqrp/

 

Buch, Neville (2023l). Conversation out in the community of the Southern Brisbane region, Dr Neville Buch Website (ABN 86703686642), https://drnevillebuch.com/conversation-out-in-the-community-of-the-southern-brisbane-region/

 

Buch, Neville (2024a). Buckley in Australia: Considering Local Social Discourses among the Australian States, (1938-1987), 4 June 2024, Public Conservative Workshop international forum. University of Manchester.

 

Buch, Neville (2024b). Populist Nationalism Will Not Deliver; We have been Here Before, many times…, Dr Neville Buch ABN: 86703686642, July 20, 2024.

 

Buccola, Nicholas (2019).  The Fire is Upon Us: James Baldwin, William F. Buckley Jr., and the Debate over Race in America, Princeton University Press.

 

Clark, Manning (1963; fourth revised 2006). A Short History of Australia, Penguin-Random House.

 

Domhoff, G. W. (2007). C. Wright Mills, Floyd Hunter, And 50 Years Of Power Structure Research. Michigan Sociological Review, 21, 1–54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969126

 

Domhoff, G. W. (2012). An Invitation to a Four-Network Theory of Power: A New Viewpoint Compatible with Elite Theory. Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, 37(1 (139)), 23–37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756448

 

Geary, D. (2008). “Becoming International Again”: C. Wright Mills and the Emergence of a Global New Left, 1956-1962. The Journal of American History, 95(3), 710–736. https://doi.org/10.2307/27694377

 

Ghiloni, B. W., & Domhoff, G. W. (1984). Power structure research in America and the promise of democracy. Revue Française d’études Américaines, 21/22, 335–341. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20873198

 

Gillam, R. (1975). C. Wright Mills and the Politics of Truth: The Power Elite Revisited. American Quarterly, 27(4), 461–479. https://doi.org/10.2307/2712332

 

Higley, J., & Pakulski, J. (2012). Elite Theory versus Marxism: The Twentieth Century’s Verdict [2000]. Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, 37(1 (139)), 320–332. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756463

 

Hofstadter, Richard (1955, re-issued 1988). The Age of Reform: From Bryan to f.d.r., New York: Random House USA Inc.

 

Hofstadter, Richard (1963). Anti-intellectualism in American Life, New York: Random House USA Inc.

 

Hofstadter, Richard (1965; rev. edition, 2008) The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays, New York: Random House USA Inc.

 

Horne, Donald (1964). The Lucky Country: Australia in the Sixties, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin.

 

Horne, Donald (1967). The Education of Young Donald, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin.

 

Horne, Donald (1976). Death of The Lucky Country, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin.

 

Horowitz, I. L. (2012). C. Wright Mills, 1916—1962: Bright Lights and Dark Shadows. Contemporary Sociology, 41(4), 413–422. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23212075

 

Jacoby, Susan (2008). The Age of American Unreason in a Culture of Lies, Vintage Books.

 

Jacoby, Russell (1987). The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe, Basic Books, New York, NY.

 

Jacoby, Russell (1999). The End of Utopia. Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy, Basic Books, New York, NY.

 

Jacoby, Russell  (2005). Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age, Columbia University Press.

 

Jacoby, Russell (2011). Bloodlust: On the Roots of Violence from Cain and Abel to the Present, Free Press, New York, NY.

 

Jacoby, Russell  (2020). On Diversity: The Eclipse of the Individual in a Global Era, Seven Stories Press, New York, NY.

 

Khan, S. R. (2012). The Sociology of Elites. Annual Review of Sociology, 38, 361–377. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23254600

 

Kraus, Michael; Joyce, Davis D. (January 1, 1990). The Writing of American History. University of Oklahoma Press.

 

Lake, Marilyn (2019). Progressive New World: How Settler Colonialism and Transpacific Exchange Shaped American Reform, Harvard University Press.

 

Lindsay, D. M. (2008). Evangelicals in the Power Elite: Elite Cohesion Advancing a Movement. American Sociological Review, 73(1), 60–82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25472514

 

Pakulski, J. (2012). The Weberian Foundations of Modern Elite Theory and Democratic Elitism. Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, 37(1 (139)), 38–56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756449

 

Rushdy, Ashraf H. A. (November 4, 1999). Neo-slave Narratives: Studies in the Social Logic of a Literary Form. Oxford University Press.

 

Mills, C. Wright 1942 (1965). “The Nazi behemoth dissected.” Partisan Review (September-October). Reprinted in Irving L. Horowitz (ed.),

 

Mills, C. Wright. (1965). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

Mills, C. Wright, and Hans H. Gerth, 1942 (reprinted 1965). “A Marx for managers.” Ethics 52 (January). Reprinted in Irving L. Horowitz (ed.), C. Wright Mills. New York: Ballantine: 53-76.

 

Moskos, C. C. (1974). The Concept of the Military-Industrial Complex: Radical Critique or Liberal Bogey? Social Problems, 21(4), 498–512. https://doi.org/10.2307/799988

 

Niebuhr, Reinhold (1932). Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons.

 

Roscigno, V. J. (1992). Conservative and Critical Approaches to The Power Structure Debate: An Assessment and Critique of Empirical Findings. Journal of Political & Military Sociology, 20(1), 63–81. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45293921

 

Sigler, J. A. (1966). The Political Philosophy of C. Wright Mills. Science & Society, 30(1), 32–49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40401173

 

Spinrad, W. (1966). The Socio-Political Orientations of C. Wright Mills: An Evaluation. The British Journal of Sociology, 17(1), 46–59. https://doi.org/10.2307/588432

 

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Wesołowski, Włodzimierz. “Ruling Class and Power Elite.” The Polish Sociological Bulletin, no. 11 (1965): 22–37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44815209.

 

Wolf, Susan. ‘One Thought Too Many’: Love, Morality, and the Ordering of Commitment’ in Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang (ed. 2012), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press.

 

 

 

Al Smith and the 2024 American Presidential Election

Al Smith and the 2024 American Presidential Election

Al Smith (1873-1944) was the first Roman Catholic to be nominated for president of the United States by a major party, with his 1928 presidential candidacy. He was the Democrat’s nominee.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

He was son of an Irish-American mother and a Civil War–veteran Italian-American father, Smith was raised on the Lower East Side of Manhattan near the Brooklyn Bridge.

 

 

The switch thesis in American politics is that the Republican Party today is more like the Democrat Party of old, and visa versa. So, remember that in the following biographical details of Alfred Smith. Al Smith was the foremost urban leader of the Efficiency Movement in the United States. Smith served as sheriff of New York County from 1916 to 1917. He was first elected governor of New York in 1918, lost his 1920 bid for re-election, and was elected governor again in 1922, 1924, and 1926. During his time as the Governor of New York, Smith became known as a progressive, however, he was notoriously an active member of Tammany Hall political machine that controlled New York City politics during his era. Tammany Hall was semi-criminal, if not outright, an organisation of criminal behaviour. Many Protestants (including German Lutherans and Southern Baptists) feared his candidacy, believing that the Pope in Rome would dictate his policies. Like many Catholics of the day, Smith was a committed “wet” (i.e., an opponent of Prohibition). Smith attracted voters who wanted beer, wine, and liquor and did not like dealing with criminal bootleggers, along with voters who were outraged that new criminal gangs had taken over the streets in most large and medium-sized cities. Herbert Hoover, aided by national prosperity, the absence of American involvement in war, and anti-Catholic bigotry, defeated Smith in a landslide in 1928.

 

 

 

The Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner, commonly known as the Al Smith Dinner, is an annual white tie dinner in New York City to raise funds for Catholic charities supporting children of various needs in the Archdiocese of New York. This year, 2024, the dinner hosted in person, Donald Trump, with Karmala Harris providing the dinner with a humorous video.

 

 

 

Comedian Jim Gaffigan served as master of ceremonies at the Al Smith Dinner in New York City. Full video here: https://www.c-span.org/video/?539275-1/president-trump-2024-alfred-e-smith-memorial-dinner&live . It is very funny for the most, but at the end with Donald Trumps, the jokes fall flat.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Featured Image: Al Smith By Harris & Ewing – This image is available from the United States Library of Congress’s Prints and Photographs divisionunder the digital ID hec.21487.This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing., Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=71136727

 

 

 

Malcolm is Correct, and the lesson applies to dealing with petit bullies

Malcolm is Correct, and the lesson applies to dealing with petit bullies

I have known in my time, petit bullies, pro-vice-chancellors, and even vice-chancellors with silence before public demand for change. Those executive officers who do have genuine conversations on the ‘demands for change’ are not bullies. The petit bullies are those executive officers who feel that they have no need to have the genuine conversation.

 

 

 

I just posted about this new idea of ‘nuanced conversations’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After seeing this image before me (thanks, Evan Hadkins), I decided to start a new major folder in my PC system, called, SIGNS OF THE TIMES.
We never needed to say, “nuanced conversations”, some decades ago among educated persons. Conversations were expected to be nuanced. The forum, though, is a good idea today, although there’s a growing number of such forums. I will mention the Southern Brisbane Suburban Forum Inc.
“Beyond The Faultlines” is the approach of excellence. It describes well the approach of today to overcome the power of morons, on or off social media, and I am not talking mental illness, I am talking ethics. Morons are the willful ignorant, selfish, egocentric, arrogant, and plain uneducated, and possibly in the habit, lazy. It is more than personality failure. It is being deliberately anti-social.

 

 

Malcolm Turnbull, in The Monthly article, “How to deal with a Trump return?” spoke about how to deal with petit bullies by speaking about how an Australian Prime Minister ought to (or should have) dealt with a Trump Presidency:

 

 

 

Issues can be worked out at official levels. By the time they reach the desk of the president or the prime minister [or vice-chancellor], they have essentially been resolved.

This type is narcissistic, driven, totally focused on accumulating wealth and power for themselves.

The one thing I had learned about this type of personality is that if you suck up to bullies or give in to them, the only thing you will get is more bullying. Punching them in the nose (metaphorically or actually) is rarely successful either.

To succeed with them, you need to stand up to them – but courteously. The only thing they respect is strength. The bully despises those people he suborns, while he respects (even if he does not like) those he cannot.

The relationship should be courteous, professional but above all businesslike.

Backslapping simply won’t do this time around.

The leaders …will be among the few who can speak truthfully ..[the petit bully] can shout at them, embarrass them, even threaten them. But he cannot fire them.

 

 

 

Featured Image: genuine conversations. ID 327476533 | Genuine Conversation © Lightfieldstudiosprod | Dreamstime.com

 

 

 

 

The conservative Atlantic is a heterodox place

The conservative Atlantic is a heterodox place

“Trump is the sphinx who stands in the way of America entering a more hopeful future. In Greek mythology, the sphinx killed every traveler who failed to answer her riddle, until Oedipus finally solved it, causing the monster’s demise. The answer to Trump lies in every American’s hands. Then he needs only to go away.”

 

 

The Atlantic is a heterodox place…”

 

 

Here is The Atlantic’s endorsement of Kamala Harris, first published on October 10, 2024. Email from The Atlantic, 30 October 2024.

 

 

 

It is a similar argument I have been making since July 2021, three years ago, in “Finding Peace from the Culture-History War: A Historiographical Message for the Times:

 

 

 

The Atlantic is still a conservative journal, but it is now being criticised by many agitators in the social media world, trying to normalise or mainstream what is anti-intellectualism, as originally described by Richard Hofstader (1962). Allen’s article is entitled, “The Road From Serfdom”, which is paying to homage to Friedrich Hayek, and a liberal-left critic would disagree with Hayek but agree with Allen that the alt-right is in danger of creating that serfdom Hayek feared coming from the Left.” (1-2)

 

 

 

REFERENCES

 

Allen, Danielle (2021). The Road From Serfdom: How Americans can become citizens again, The Atlantic, December 2019 [published online].

 

Buch, Neville (2021). Finding Peace from the Culture-History War: A Historiographical Message for the Times. Academia Letters, Article 1916. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1916.

 

Buch, Neville (2023). Research Note: Anglo-American Major Belief-Doubt Systems, Dr Neville Buch ABN: 86703686642,
https://www.academia.edu/104984588/Research_Note_Anglo_American_Major_Belief_Doubt_Systems , 27 July 2023.

 

Hofstader, Richard (1962). Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, Vintage Books.

 

 

The conservative Atlantic is a heterodox place

The Allan Lichtman Historiography

Allan Jay Lichtman (born April 4, 1947) is an American historian. He has taught at American University in Washington, D.C. since 1973. Lichtman created The Keys to the White House system with Soviet seismologist Vladimir Keilis-Borok in 1981. The system uses 13 true/false criteria to predict whether the presidential candidate of the incumbent party will win or lose the next election. The system and Lichtman’s predictions based on it have received extensive media coverage. Lichtman is credited with a high degree of accuracy in predicting the outcome of the elections from 1984 through 2020 using the system. (from Wikipedia entry).

 

 

 

The Keys to the White House, also known as the 13 Keys, is a prediction system for determining the outcome of presidential elections in the United States. It was developed by American historian Allan Lichtman and Russian geophysicist Vladimir Keilis-Borok in 1981, adapting unproven prediction methods that Keilis-Borok designed for earthquake prediction. The system is a thirteen-point checklist that uses true-or-false statements: when five or fewer items on the checklist are false, the nominee of the incumbent party is predicted to win the election, but when six or more items on the checklist are false, the nominee of the challenging party is predicted to win. Some of the items on the checklist involve qualitative judgment, and therefore the system relies heavily on the knowledge and analytical skill of whoever attempts to apply it. Using the system, Lichtman has correctly predicted the popular vote outcome of each presidential election from 1984 to 2012. Though Lichtman claims that he correctly called the 2016 election by using the system, his 2016 book and paper stated that the Keys to the White House were designed to predict the outcome of the popular vote, which Donald Trump lost. Following this, he stated that recent demographics changes give the Democratic Party an advantage over the Republican Party in the popular vote in close elections. He correctly called the outcome of the 2020 election. The challenge in the Lichtman system is the difference between the popular vote and the American college system.

 

 

 

The results from the American Tuesday/Australian Wednesday election will determine the contemporary history of the global culture-history war. The Lichtman system on that day, with the actual result, will also determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the American college system, according to democratic theory.

 

 

For further information on the Lichtman system, see Allan Lichtman (YouTube).

 

 

 

Lichtman Thirteen Keys (Wikipedia entry)

 

The system consists of 13 true/false statements pertaining to circumstances surrounding a presidential election, with an answer of “true” always favoring the incumbent party.

 

If five or fewer keys are false, this indicates political stability and the incumbent party is predicted to win the election. If six or more are false, this indicates a political earthquake and the incumbent party is predicted to lose.

 

1. Party mandate. After the midterm elections, the incumbent party holds more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives than after the previous midterm elections.
2. No primary contest. There is no serious contest for the incumbent party nomination.
3. Incumbent seeking re-election. The incumbent party candidate is the sitting president.
4. No third party. There is no significant third party or independent campaign.
5. Strong short-term economy. The economy is not in recession during the election campaign.
6. Strong long-term economy. Real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean growth during the previous two terms.
7. Major policy change. The incumbent administration effects major changes in national policy.
8. No social unrest. There is no sustained social unrest during the term.
9. No scandal. The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.
10. No foreign or military failure. The incumbent administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs.
11. Major foreign or military success. The incumbent administration achieves a major success in foreign or military affairs.
12. Charismatic incumbent. The incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero.
13. Uncharismatic challenger. The challenging party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero.

 

 

Party mandate (1)
Key 1 (party mandate) is turned true if the incumbent party has achieved a net gain of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in the previous presidential and midterm elections combined. For example, Lichtman refers to the 1982 U.S. House elections in the middle of Ronald Reagan’s first term when the Republicans lost 27 seats: as the Republicans had gained 35 seats in 1980, this left them with a net gain of eight seats, turning the key true.

 

Lichtman says that midterm elections reflect the performance of the incumbent party and are an indicator of nationwide electoral trends. Additionally, if the incumbent party performs poorly, a large loss of House seats can also affect the president’s ability to enact policy, which can result in other keys turning false.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won the popular vote on 12 of the 14 occasions when it achieved a net gain of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, compared to the previous midterm elections, losing the Electoral College in 2000, with the exceptions being in 1860 and 1952. The incumbent party has lost the popular vote on 14 of the 27 occasions that key 1 was false, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 1888 and 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1872, 1900, 1916, 1924, 1940, 1944, 1948, 1964, 1972, 1996, and 2012.

 

No primary contest (2)
Key 2 (no primary contest) is turned true if the incumbent party nominee wins at least two-thirds of the total delegate vote on the first ballot at the nominating convention, with no deep and vocal party divisions.

 

Lichtman says the incumbent party’s ability to unite behind a consensus nominee is reflective of successful governance, whereas a contested nomination is indicative of internal party strife caused by weak governance.

 

Notable primary contests that turned the key false occurred in 1860 (the Democrats split between Northern Democrats and Southern Democrats over slavery, with two conventions and 59 ballots being required to nominate Stephen A. Douglas), 1896 (due to a dispute between the Bourbon wing of the Democrats led by sitting president Grover Cleveland and the populist wing of the Democrats led by William Jennings Bryan, the convention required five ballots to nominate Bryan), 1912 (the Republicans split between the conservatives of President William Howard Taft and the progressives of former President Theodore Roosevelt, with Taft being nominated for re-election on the first ballot of the convention with only 52% of the delegate vote after progressives walked out), and in 1968 (there were deep and vocal divisions within the Democrats over the Vietnam War, including strong opposition by the anti-Vietnam War wing of the Democrats to the nomination of Vice President Hubert Humphrey).

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party won the popular vote on 23 of the 28 occasions when key 2 was true, losing the Electoral College in 1888 and 2000, with the exceptions being in 1932, 1960, 1992, 2008, and 2020. The incumbent party has lost the popular vote on 11 of the 13 occasions that key 2 was false, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exception being in 1880. Of the 13 keys, Lichtman has said that this key is the single best predictor of an election outcome.

 

Conversely, a serious contest for the challenging party’s nomination does not harm its nominee’s election prospects, as a weak incumbent party often results in a crowded challenging party primary field in anticipation of a winnable general election. Landslide challenging party popular vote victories coming after a serious contest for the party’s nomination include those of Republican Abraham Lincoln in 1860 (10.13 points), Democrat Woodrow Wilson in 1912 (18.67 points), Republican Warren G. Harding in 1920 (26.17 points), and Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 (17.76 points).

 

Incumbent seeking re-election (3)
Lichtman says an incumbent president seeking re-election has several advantages, such as the ability to set the national agenda, and will often attract much more media attention than a non-incumbent. The president can also benefit from the rally ’round the flag effect in times of crisis.

 

Lichtman also says that presidents running for re-election will rarely face the strongest candidates from the challenging party, as they typically refrain from running unless the president is seen as very vulnerable.

 

As of the 2020 election, when there was an incumbent president running for re-election and key 3 was true, the president won the popular vote on 18 of 25 occasions, losing the Electoral College in 1888. Of the 16 open seat elections (when key 3 was false), the incumbent party lost the popular vote on nine occasions, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 2000 and 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1868, 1880, 1908, 1928, and 1988.

 

The incumbency key also correlates with key 2 (no primary contest), as it usually guarantees there will be no serious contest for the incumbent party’s nomination. As of the 2020 election, when the president was running for re-election and faced no serious contest for their party’s nomination, thus turning key 2 true, the president won the popular vote on 18 of 21 occasions, losing the Electoral College in 1888, with the exceptions being in 1932, 1992, and 2020.

 

If there is a serious primary contest to the president, it signifies major discontent within their own party and thus the broader electorate. On all four occasions when the president was running for re-election and key 2 was turned false, in 1892, 1912, 1976, and 1980, the president was defeated.

 

No third party (4)
Key 4 (no third party) is turned false if there is a major candidate other than the nominees of the Democrats and the Republicans.

 

American presidential elections since 1860 have largely been de facto binary contests between Democrats and Republicans, as no third party candidate has come close to winning. Lichtman says that if a third party candidate is unusually popular, it signals major discontent with the performance of the incumbent party and counts against them: he defines third parties as either perennial (having small and loyal constituencies) or insurgent (rising in response to particular circumstances).

 

Retrospectively, the key was turned false if a single third party candidate won 5% or more of the national popular vote or there was a significant split in the incumbent party: for example, in 1948, Henry A. Wallace and Strom Thurmond both split from the Democrats and ran notable insurgent campaigns, turning the key false for President Harry S. Truman despite no third party candidate winning 5% of the popular vote.

 

For upcoming elections, key 4 is turned false if a single third party candidate consistently polls at 10% or more, indicating they are likely to receive 5% or more of the national popular vote: third party candidates typically underperform their polling by around half, with Lichtman saying they tend to fade in the voting booth as voters focus on the major party candidates. Key 4 is the only key that concerns any polling of candidates.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has been defeated on six of the nine occasions when there has been a significant third party candidate, with the exceptions being in 1924, 1948, and 1996. The incumbent party has won the popular vote on 22 of the 32 occasions that key 4 was true, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 1888, 2000, and 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1884, 1896, 1920, 1932, 1952, 1960, 1976, 2008, and 2020.

 

Strong long-term and short-term economy (5 and 6)
Key 5 (strong short-term economy) is turned false if the economy is in recession during the election campaign.

 

Lichtman cites the early 1990s recession as an example: the recession ended in March 1991, but the National Bureau of Economic Research did not officially declare the recession had ended until 50 days after the election, turning the key false for George H. W. Bush.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won the popular vote on 25 of the 31 occasions that key 5 was true, losing the Electoral College in 1888, 2000 and 2016, with the exceptions being in 1860, 1892, 1912, 1952, 1968, and 1976. The incumbent party has lost the popular vote on all ten occasions that key 5 was false, only winning the Electoral College in 1876.

 

Key 6 (strong long-term economy) is turned true if the real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds the mean growth during the previous two terms: Lichtman states that slow economic growth is indicative of an administration’s lack of strength.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won the popular vote on 17 of the 22 occasions that key 6 was true, losing the Electoral College in 1888, 2000, and 2016, with the exceptions being in 1860, 1892, 1912, 1968 and 1980. The incumbent party has lost the popular vote on 11 of the 19 occasions that key 6 was false, winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1864, 1908, 1916, 1948, 1972, 1984, 2004, and 2012.

 

The incumbent party has won the popular vote on 17 of the 21 occasions when both economy keys were true, losing the Electoral College in 1888, 2000, and 2016, with the exceptions being in 1860, 1892, 1912, and 1968. On all nine occasions when both economy keys were false, the incumbent party lost the popular vote, only winning the Electoral College in 1876.

 

Major policy change (7)
Key 7 (major policy change) is turned true if the incumbent administration redirects the course of government or enacts a major policy change that has broad effects on the country’s commerce, welfare or outlook: it does not matter whether the change is popular with the public, nor does it matter what ideological mold it was cast from. Abraham Lincoln abolishing slavery, Franklin D. Roosevelt enacting the New Deal, and Barack Obama enacting the Affordable Care Act were policy changes that turned the key true.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on 15 of the 19 occasions that key 7 was true, with the exceptions being in 1892, 1920, 1968, and 2020. The incumbent party has lost the popular vote on 12 of the 22 occasions that key 7 was false, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 1888, 2000 and 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1872, 1928, 1956, 1972, 1988, 1996, and 2004.

 

This key often correlates with other keys: for example, Herbert Hoover’s failure to take vigorous action during the Great Depression prolonged the Depression, which in turn led to widespread social unrest, Hoover’s Republicans having a large loss of House seats in the midterm elections, and the nomination of a charismatic challenger in Franklin D. Roosevelt.

 

No social unrest (8)
Key 8 (no social unrest) is turned false if there is widespread violent unrest that is sustained or leaves critical issues unresolved by the time of the election campaign, making the voters call into serious question the stability of the country.

The American Civil War, the Red Summer of 1919, the racial and anti-Vietnam War protests of 1968, and the protests of 2020 triggered by the murder of George Floyd were incidents of unrest that were sufficiently serious and widespread to turn the key false. By contrast, the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, the 1921 Tulsa race riots, the 1980 Miami race riots, and the 1992 Los Angeles riots were too localized to turn the key false.

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has lost the popular vote on seven of the 11 occasions that there was sustained social unrest during the term, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 1888, with the exceptions being in 1864, 1868 and 1872. The incumbent party has won the popular vote on 21 of the 30 occasions that key 8 was true, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 2000 and 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1884, 1912, 1952, 1960, 1976, 1980, 1992, and 2008.

 

No scandal (9)
Key 9 (no scandal), a key that Lichtman declared as his personal favorite, is turned false if there is bipartisan recognition of serious impropriety that is directly linked to the president, such as widespread corruption in the Cabinet and/or officials of an incumbent administration, or presidential misconduct resulting in a bipartisan impeachment. By contrast, the voters ignore allegations of wrongdoing that appear to be the product of partisan politicking or are not directly linked to the president: for example, the impeachment of Andrew Johnson in 1868 and the Iran-Contra affair during Ronald Reagan’s second term did not turn the key false.

 

The Watergate scandal began during Republican President Richard Nixon’s first term, but it did not affect Nixon’s re-election bid in 1972, since the voters believed at the time that it was political point-scoring by the Democrats. After Nixon’s re-election, new information came to light that implicated him in the scandal and raised concerns among Republicans, turning the key false: the scandal resulted in Nixon’s resignation, and contributed to the Republicans’ defeat in 1976.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has lost the popular vote on four of the six occasions that the incumbent administration was tainted by major scandal, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 2000 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exception being in 1924. The incumbent party has won the popular vote on 23 of the 35 occasions that key 9 was true, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 1888 and 2016, with the exceptions being in 1860, 1884, 1892, 1896, 1912, 1920, 1932, 1960, 1968, 1980, 1992, and 2008.

 

Foreign or military failure and success (10 and 11)
Key 10 (no foreign or military failure) is turned false if a failure occurs that is perceived to undermine the standing of the United States and/or erode trust in the president’s leadership. Lichtman cites the attack on Pearl Harbor under Franklin D. Roosevelt, the botched Bay of Pigs invasion under John F. Kennedy, North Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam War under Gerald Ford, and the Iranian hostage crisis under Jimmy Carter as failures that turned the key false. By contrast, failed diplomatic initiatives, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s failure to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, will not turn the key false.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has been defeated on seven of the 11 occasions that the incumbent administration suffered a major failure in foreign or military affairs, with the exceptions being in 1944, 1948, 1964 and 2004. The incumbent party has won the popular vote on 21 of the 30 occasions that key 10 was true, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 1888, 2000, and 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1860, 1884, 1892, 1896, 1912, 1932, 1992 and 2020.

 

Key 11 (major foreign or military success) is turned true if an achievement is seen as improving the prestige and interests of the United States. Lichtman cites the formation of NATO under Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower negotiating an armistice to the Korean War, John F. Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the killing of Osama bin Laden under Barack Obama as successes that turned the key true.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on 17 of the 21 occasions when it achieved a major success in foreign or military affairs, with the exceptions being in 1920, 1952, 1980 and 1992. The incumbent party has lost the popular vote on 12 of the 20 occasions that key 11 was false, winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College in 1888, 2000, and 2016 and winning the Electoral College in 1876, with the exceptions being in 1880, 1936, 1940, 1984, and 1996.

 

The incumbent party has won re-election on 13 of the 14 occasions that both foreign and military affairs keys were true, with the exception being in 1992. On all four occasions that both foreign and military affairs keys were false, in 1960, 1968, 1976, and 2008, the incumbent party was defeated.

 

Candidate charisma (12 and 13)
Key 12 (charismatic incumbent) is turned true if the incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero, while key 13 (uncharismatic challenger) is turned false if the challenging party candidate is charismatic or a national hero. Key 13 is the only key that pertains to the challenging party.

 

Lichtman defines a charismatic candidate as one with an extraordinarily persuasive or dynamic personality that gives him or her broad appeal that extends to voters outside their party’s base. Having studied the political careers of all historical presidential candidates, Lichtman found that James G. Blaine, William Jennings Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama had charisma that was exceptional enough to make a measurable difference in their political fortunes. By contrast, Lichtman found that while Donald Trump had an intense appeal, it was with only a narrow slice of the electorate, as opposed to the broad appeal that Ronald Reagan had with traditionally Democratic voters.

 

Lichtman has said that it is possible for candidates to lose their charismatic status: William Jennings Bryan was seen as charismatic and inspirational in 1896 and 1900 but his voter appeal had faded and he had become the subject of frequent press ridicule in 1908, while Barack Obama exuded charisma in 2008 but failed to have the same success in connecting with the voters in 2012.

 

Lichtman defines a candidate as a national hero if they are seen by the public as having played a critical role in the success of a national endeavor: he found that Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower were seen as national heroes, as both were great war leaders instrumental to major American victories. By contrast, he said that while many Americans admired John McCain for his military service, he was not seen as a national hero because he had not led the country through war.

 

As of the 2020 election, the incumbent party has won re-election on eight of the ten occasions that key 12 was true, with the exceptions being in 1884 and 1896. The incumbent party has been defeated on five of the six occasions that key 13 was false, with the exception being in 1900.

 

 

 

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