Compatibility: Consistent Intellectual Thought (academia.edu paper)

May 13, 2025
Consistent Intellectual Thought     As consistent intellectual thought, principles are only made compatible contextually. In a moment of time, one principle prioritises over another, but this does not deny the other principle. The other principle is still held, but is merely held over to the next moment of time when it is called upon. […]

Consistent Intellectual Thought

 

 

As consistent intellectual thought, principles are only made compatible contextually. In a moment of time, one principle prioritises over another, but this does not deny the other principle. The other principle is still held, but is merely held over to the next moment of time when it is called upon. This is different to a cherry-picking strategy in that the application of the first principle in the first timing, before the selection of another principle, holds that all true principles are held to be true, and that the argument is on the application to the context. It is the Aristotelian mega-principle that each good true principle has the sum of all principle. If the argument is not on the correct application to the context, and if another principle is held up to misappropriating context, rather than for the moment of time to be held in abeyance, then there is something incorrect. You have your Popperian principle of falsification.

 

 

 

Featured Image: The Dynamic of Cognition

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Neville Buch (Pronounced Book) Ph.D. is a certified member of the Professional Historians Association (Queensland). Since 2010 he has operated a sole trade business in history consultancy. He was a Q ANZAC 100 Fellow 2014-2015 at the State Library of Queensland. Dr Buch was the PHA (Qld) e-Bulletin, the monthly state association’s electronic publication, and was a member of its Management Committee. He is the Managing Director of the Brisbane Southside History Network.
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