A colleague offered a conundrum, which today I believe should be dissolved as Wittgenstein’s bewitchment of language.
He contrasted Karl Popper’s (1902-1994) Three Worlds of Knowledge — Platonic, Physical, Mental — with Roger Penrose’s (1931-) observation that:
“Undoubted, in reality there are not three worlds, but only one, and the true nature of this world we cannot at present even guess at.”
I believe Penrose is correct, with aligning his “the true nature of this world” (thisness or Haecceity) to what is outside the mental world. Everything else scopes to the mental world (perception). Mathematical monism and perceptive pluralism are not in conflict with each other, as the fools wish it to be (those intent on conflict, warfare, and violence; curse them). Karl Popper was working with models now surpassed by other models which provide a better ‘fit’.
The primary thisness is within the mental world and its judgements are of the mental world: perception, abstraction, judgement, and meta-judgement. All need to be balanced out and fit together in a model. The direct realists are truly naive.

Featured Image: Buch’s Ontological Thinking
Neville Buch
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