2025-03-01. The Philosophy Cafe’s History of Cognition. Discussion Sheet

February 24, 2025
  THE HISTORY OF COGNITION The Philosophy Café 1 March 2025 Dr Neville Buch, MPHA (QLD)   Based on the sources provided, here’s a chronological outline of the history of cognition, drawing primarily from Buch’s “History of Cognition” (1):   Seventeenth Century:   René Descartes explored early theories of cognition (2).   Nineteenth Century:   […]

 

THE HISTORY OF COGNITION

The Philosophy Café

1 March 2025

Dr Neville Buch, MPHA (QLD)

 

Based on the sources provided, here’s a chronological outline of the history of cognition, drawing primarily from Buch’s “History of Cognition” (1):

 

Seventeenth Century:

 

René Descartes explored early theories of cognition (2).

 

Nineteenth Century:

 

Wilhelm Wundt emphasized introspection (2).

 

Hermann Ebbinghaus studied memory and forgetting curves (3).

 

William James critiqued introspection and studied cognitive science (3).

 

Early 20th Century:

 

Jean Piaget studied cognitive development in children, leading to his theory of developmental stages (4).

 

Emergence of Cognitivism as a response to behaviourism in psychology (4). Key figures include Karen Horney, Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Albert Ellis (5). Ellis was influenced by Alfred Korzybski (5).

 

Mid to Late 20th Century:

 

Aaron Beck developed cognitive therapy and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) (6). He drew influence from George Kelly’s personal construct theory and Piaget’s schemas (7).

 

Gilbert Ryle critiqued cognitivism with the homunculus fallacy (8).

 

Late 20th Century Onward:

 

Development of Metacognition: John H. Flavell coined the term “metacognition” (9). Research distinguishes between monitoring and control in metacognition (10). Cognitive neuroscience views metacognitive processes as functions of the prefrontal cortex (11).

 

It’s worth noting that Jürgen Habermas’s work also touches on cognition, particularly in the context of social evolution and communicative competence (12). His theories involve cognitive development as part of a broader framework that includes linguistic and interactive development (13). Habermas identifies homologous structures of consciousness in individual and species’ histories, particularly concerning cognitive development (14). He references Piaget’s universal developmental sequence for cognitive development (15).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ENDNOTES

 

  1. History of Cognition

The Philosophy Café

1 March 2025

Dr Neville Buch

Editing Note: For the Paper there has been copied and paste multiple Wikipedia phrasing and paragraphs, but rearranged editing (with further insights) into a unique paper on the history of cognition. Bibliography has extensive references to the history and philosophy of cognition. The Paper is a performance of a “human machine”, better than A.I. outcomes.

 

2-15. Further Notes on Thinkers

 

Early theorists of Cognition

 

René Descartes (1596–1650) was a seventeenth-century philosopher who came up with the phrase “Cogito, ergo sum”, which means “I think, therefore I am.” He took a philosophical approach to the study of cognition and the mind; with his Meditations he wanted people to meditate along with him to come to the same conclusions as he did but in their own free cognition.

 

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) is associated with the Enlightenment, Sturm und Drang, and Weimar Classicism. He is credited with establishing or advancing a number of important disciplines: hermeneutics, linguistics, anthropology, and “a secular philosophy of history.” Herder also fostered the ideal of a person’s individuality. Although he had from an early period championed the individuality of cultures – for example, in his This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity (1774), he also championed the individuality of persons within a culture; for example, in his On Thomas Abbt’s Writings (1768) and On the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul (1778).

 

Avi Lifschitz subsequently reframed Herder’s “the organ of thought” quotation: “Herder’s equation of word and idea, of language and cognition, prompted a further attack on any attribution of the first words to the imitation of natural sounds, to the physiology of the vocal organs, or to social convention… [Herder argued] for the linguistic character of our cognition but also for the cognitive nature of human language. One could not think without language, as various Enlightenment thinkers argued, but at the same time one could not properly speak without perceiving the world in a uniquely human way… man would not be himself without language and active reflection, while language deserved its name only as a cognitive aspect of the entire human being.” In response to criticism of these contentions, Herder resisted descriptions of his findings as “conjectural” pasts, casting his arguments for a dearth of cognition in humans and “the problem of the origin of language as a synchronic issue rather than a diachronic one.

 

Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) emphasized the notion of what he called introspection: examining the inner feelings of an individual. With introspection, the subject had to be careful with describing their feelings in the most objective manner possible in order for Wundt to find the information scientific. Though Wundt’s contributions are by no means minimal, modern psychologists find his methods to be too subjective and choose to rely on more objective procedures of experimentation to make conclusions about the human cognitive process.

 

Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909) conducted cognitive studies that mainly examined the function and capacity of human memory. Ebbinghaus developed his own experiment in which he constructed over 2,000 syllables made out of nonexistent words (for instance, ‘EAS’). He then examined his own personal ability to learn these non-words. He purposely chose non-words as opposed to real words to control for the influence of pre-existing experience on what the words might symbolize, thus enabling easier recollection of them. Ebbinghaus observed and hypothesized a number of variables that may have affected his ability to learn and recall the non- words he created. One of the reasons, he concluded, was the amount of time between the presentation of the list of stimuli and the recitation or recall of the same. Ebbinghaus was the first to record and plot a “learning curve” and a “forgetting curve”. His work heavily influenced the study of serial position and its effect on memory.

 

William James (1842–1910) is another pivotal figure in the history of cognitive science. James was quite discontent with Wundt’s emphasis on introspection and Ebbinghaus’ use of nonsense stimuli. He instead chose to focus on the human learning experience in everyday life and its importance to the study of cognition. James’ most significant contribution to the study and theory of cognition was his textbook Principles of Psychology which preliminarily examines aspects of cognition such as perception, memory, reasoning, and attention.

 

Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) was an influential American pioneer in the realm of psychology. Her work also focused on human memory capacity. A common theory, called the recency effect, can be attributed to the studies that she conducted. The recency effect, also discussed in the subsequent experiment section, is the tendency for individuals to be able to accurately recollect the final items presented in a sequence of stimuli. Calkin’s theory is closely related to the aforementioned study and conclusion of the memory experiments conducted by Hermann Ebbinghaus.

 

Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) was an American anthropologist and folklorist. Both Benedict and Margaret Mead wanted to dislodge stereotypes about women that were widely believed during their time and to show people that working women could also be successful even though working society was seen as a man’s world. The essential idea in Patterns of Culture is, according to the foreword by Margaret Mead, “her view that human cultures are ‘personality writ large.'” As Benedict wrote in that book, “A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action” (46). Each culture, she held, chooses from “the great arc of human potentialities” only a few characteristics, which become the leading personality traits of the persons living in that culture. Those traits comprise an interdependent constellation of aesthetics and values in each culture which together add up to a unique gestalt. For example, Benedict described the emphasis on restraint in Pueblo cultures of the American Southwest and the emphasis on abandon in the Native American cultures of the Great Plains. She used the Nietzschean opposites of “Apollonian” and “Dionysian” as the stimulus for her thought about these Native American cultures. She describes how in ancient Greece the worshipers of Apollo emphasized order and calm in their celebrations. Other anthropologists of the culture and personality school also developed those ideas, notably Margaret Mead in her Coming of Age in Samoa (published before “Patterns of Culture”) and Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (published just after Benedict’s book came out). Benedict was a senior student of Franz Boas when Mead began to study with them, and they had extensive and reciprocal influence on each other’s work. Abram Kardiner was also affected by these ideas, and in time, the concept of “modal personality” was born: the cluster of traits most commonly thought to be observed in people of any given culture.

 

Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was one of the most important and influential people in the field of developmental psychology. He believed that humans are unique in comparison to animals because we have the capacity to do “abstract symbolic reasoning”. His work can be compared to Lev Vygotsky, Sigmund Freud, and Erik Erikson who were also great contributors in the field of developmental psychology. Piaget is known for studying the cognitive development in children, having studied his own three children and their intellectual development, from which he would come to a theory of cognitive development that describes the developmental stages of childhood.

 

Early theorists of Cognitivism (20th century psychology)

 

In psychology, cognitivism is a theoretical framework for understanding the mind that gained credence in the 1950s. The movement was a response to behaviourism, which cognitivists said neglected to explain cognition. Cognitive psychology derived its name from the Latin cognoscere, referring to knowing and information, thus cognitive psychology is an information-processing psychology derived in part from earlier traditions of the investigation of thought and problem solving.  The writings of Karen Horney, Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan and Albert Ellis would shape psychological models. Ellis credits Alfred Korzybski, his book, Science and Sanity, and general semantics for starting him on the philosophical path for founding rational therapy. In addition, modern and ancient philosophy (particularly stoicism), and his own experiences heavily influenced his new theoretical developments to psychotherapy. Ellis acknowledged that his therapy was “by no means entirely new”, as in particular Paul Charles Dubois’s “rational persuasion” had prefigured some of its main principles; Ellis stated he had read him some years after inventing his therapy, but had studied Émile Coué since a young age.

 

Alfred Korzybski (1879-1950) is a Polish-American independent scholar who developed a field called general semantics, which he viewed as both distinct from, and more encompassing than, the field of semantics. He argued that human knowledge of the world is limited both by the human nervous system and the languages humans have developed, and thus no one can have direct access to reality, given that the most we can know is that which is filtered through the brain’s responses to reality. His best-known dictum is “The map is not the territory”.

 

Erich Fromm (1900-1980) was a German-American social psychologist, psychoanalyst, sociologist, humanistic philosopher, and democratic socialist. He was one of the founders of The William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and Psychology in New York City and was associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theory. Fromm belongs to a Neo-Freudian school of psychoanalytical thought. Fromm’s best-known work, Escape from Freedom, focuses on the human urge to seek a source of authority and control upon reaching a freedom that was thought to be an individual’s true desire. Fromm’s critique of the modern political order and capitalist system led him to seek insights from medieval feudalism. In Escape from Freedom, he found value in the lack of individual freedom, rigid structure, and obligations required on the members of medieval society. In Eros and Civilization, Herbert Marcuse is critical of Fromm. In the beginning, from the view of the widely-held critique Fromm was a radical theorist, but later he turned to conformity.

 

Albert Ellis (1913-2007) was an American psychologist and psychotherapist who founded rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT). He is generally considered to be one of the originators of the cognitive revolutionary paradigm shift in psychotherapy and an early proponent and developer of cognitive-behavioural therapies. From the late 1940s onward, Ellis worked on rational emotive behavioural therapy (REBT), and by January 1953 his break with psychoanalysis was complete, and he began calling himself a rational therapist. Ellis was now advocating a new more active and directive type of psychotherapy. In 1955, he presented rational therapy (RT). In RT, the therapist sought to help the client understand—and act on the understanding—that his personal philosophy contained beliefs that contributed to his own emotional pain. This new approach stressed actively working to change a client’s self-defeating beliefs and behaviours by demonstrating their irrationality, self- defeatism, and rigidity. Ellis believed that through rational analysis and cognitive reconstruction, people could understand their self-defeatingness in light of their core irrational beliefs and then develop more rational constructs.

 

Aaron Beck (1921-2021) was an American psychiatrist who was a professor in the department of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania. He is regarded as the father of cognitive therapy and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). His pioneering methods are widely used in the treatment of clinical depression and various anxiety disorders. In 1994 he and his daughter, psychologist Judith S. Beck, founded the nonprofit Beck Institute for Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, which provides CBT treatment and training, as well as research. Through the 1950s, Beck adhered to the department’s psychoanalytic theories while pursuing experimentation and harbouring private doubts. In 1961, however, controversy over whom to appoint the new chair of psychiatry—specifically, fierce psychoanalytic opposition to the favoured choice of biomedical researcher Eli Robins—brought matters to a head, an early skirmish in a power shift away from psychoanalysis nationally. Beck tried to remain neutral and, with Albert J. Stunkard, opposed a petition to block Robins. Stunkard, a behaviourist who specialized in obesity and who had dropped out of psychoanalytic training, was eventually appointed department head in the face of sustained opposition which again Beck would not engage in, putting him at bitter odds with his friend Stein. In 1962, Beck requested a sabbatical and would go into private practice for five years. In that same year, he was already making notes about patterns of thoughts in depression, emphasizing what can be observed and tested by anyone and treated in the present. He was engaged by George Kelly’s personal construct theory and Jean Piaget’s schemas. Beck’s first articles on the cognitive theory of depression, in 1963 and 1964 in the Archives of General Psychiatry, maintained the psychiatric context of ego psychology but then turned to concepts of realistic and scientific thinking in the terms of the new cognitive psychology, extended to become a therapeutic need. Beck recalled that Ellis contacted him in the mid-1960s after his two articles in the Archives of General Psychiatry, and therefore he discovered Ellis had developed a rich theory and pragmatic therapy that he was able to use to some extent as a framework blended with his own, though he disliked Ellis’s technique of telling patients what he thought was going on rather than helping the client to learn for themselves empirically. Both Beck and Ellis cited aspects of the ancient philosophical system of Stoicism as a forerunner of their ideas. Beck cited Epictetus as an influence from Stoicism. Criticisms of psychological cognitivism

 

Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) offered an early and key argument against cognitivism, known as the problems of Ryle’s Regress or the homunculus fallacy. The argument in an examination of language, concluding cognitive theories are essentially meaningless as they do not explain what they purport to. Cognitivists have offered a number of arguments attempting to refute these attacks. The most simple and straightforward is to point out that the Rylean model in the philosophy of mind is based singularly on pulling the rug out from the intellectualist claims in an infinite regress of thought. The crucial objection to the intellectualist claims is that the consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid, but if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. The Rylean model, however, becomes outdated and not relevant to later coherence models which cognitionists used. Coherence does not seek to break the cycle of spiral. It seeks to account for the internalist comprehensiveness of the logic where no outside logic can be demonstrated.

 

Roger Penrose (1931-) uses Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (which states that there are mathematical truths which can never be proven in a sufficiently strong mathematical system; any sufficiently strong system of axioms will also be incomplete) and Turing’s halting problem (which states that there are some things which are inherently non-computable) as evidence for his position. Penrose’s ideas about the human thought process are at present a minority view in scientific circles, citing Minsky’s criticisms and quoting science journalist Charles Seife’s description of Penrose as “one of a handful of scientists” who believe that the nature of consciousness suggests a quantum process. The Penrose–Lucas argument about the implications of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem for computational theories of human intelligence has been criticised by mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers. Many experts in these fields assert that Penrose’s argument fails, though different authors may choose different aspects of the argument to attack. Marvin Minsky, a leading proponent of artificial intelligence, was particularly critical, stating that Penrose “tries to show, in chapter after chapter, that human thought cannot be based on any known scientific principle.”

 

John Searle (1931) has developed two arguments, the first (well-known through his Chinese room thought experiment) is the ‘syntax is not semantics’ argument—that a program is just syntax, while understanding requires semantics; therefore programs (hence cognitivism) cannot explain understanding. Such an argument presupposes the controversial notion of a private language. The second, which Searle now prefers but is less well known, is his ‘syntax is not physics’ argument—nothing in the world is intrinsically a computer program except as applied, described, or interpreted by an observer, so either everything can be described as a computer and trivially a brain can but then this does not explain any specific mental processes, or there is nothing intrinsic in a brain that makes it a computer (program). Many oppose these views and have criticized his arguments, which have created significant disagreement. Both points, Searle claims, refute cognitivism. However, Searle is too binary in his thinking in the difference between the natural and artefact models, where Searle objects apply to Strong AI but not necessarily to Soft AI theses. Biological naturalism implies that if humans want to create a conscious being, they will have to duplicate whatever physical processes the brain goes through to cause consciousness. Searle thereby means to contradict what he calls “Strong AI”, defined by the assumption that “the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states.” A Soft AI would agree that a machine is not a mind, and is instrumental which extends human consciousness, thereby explaining the characteristics which appear “human” but not; a tool of human consciousness.

 

Early theorists of Metacognition

 

Metacognition is an awareness of one’s thought processes and an understanding of the patterns behind them. The term comes from the root word meta, meaning “beyond”, or “on top of”. Metacognition can take many forms, such as reflecting on one’s ways of thinking, and knowing when and how oneself and others use particular strategies for problem-solving. There are generally two components of metacognition: (1) cognitive conceptions and (2) cognitive regulation system. Research has shown that both components of metacognition play key roles in metaconceptual knowledge and learning. Metamemory, defined as knowing about memory and mnemonic strategies, is an important aspect of metacognition.

 

John H. Flavell (1928-), an American developmental psychologist, gave the label ‘metacognition’, as the meta-reflection upon Cognitivism, but the writings on metacognition date back at least as far as two works by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC): On the Soul and the Parva Naturalia. Flavell specialised in children’s cognitive development who serves as Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor, Emeritus at Stanford University. A foundational researcher of metacognition and metamemory, he is a member of both the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His studies assessed young children’s ability to acknowledge that a given object is really one kind of thing, yet appears to be another kind of thing, or that a given piece of material is really one colour, yet appears to be another colour under particular circumstances. Flavell and his colleagues have found that whereas most three-year-olds fail these tasks, five-year-olds and older four-year-olds succeed on them. Flavell interprets this developmental difference as suggesting that children acquire the notion of mental representation of reality as distinct from reality itself. The appearance–reality paradigm, along with the false-belief task, is widely used as diagnostic of theory of mind development during early childhood. Flavell’s other work has addressed children’s developing understanding of perception, perspective-taking, and their introspective insight into their own subjective experiences.

 

Andreas Demetriou (1950-) is a Greek Cypriot developmental psychologist and former Minister of Education and Culture of Cyprus. He is a founding fellow and president of The Cyprus Academy of Sciences, Letters and Arts. Andreas Demetriou’s theory (one of the neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development) used the term hyper-cognition to refer to self-monitoring, self-representation, and self-regulation processes, which are regarded as integral components of the human mind. Moreover, with his colleagues, he showed that these processes participate in general intelligence, together with processing efficiency and reasoning, which have traditionally been considered to compose fluid intelligence.

 

Gavriel Salomon (1938-2016) was an Israeli educational psychologist who conducted research on cognition and instruction. He was a Professor Emeritus in the department of education at the University of Haifa. Gavriel Salomon with D. N. Perkins observed that metacognition concerns students’ ability to monitor their progress. During this process, students ask questions like “What am I doing now?”, “Is it getting me anywhere?”, and “What else could I be doing instead?”. Perkins and Salomon argue that such metacognitive practices help students to avoid unproductive approaches. Others, in the 21st century In the domain of experimental psychology, an influential distinction in metacognition (proposed by T. O. Nelson & L. Narens) is between Monitoring—making judgments about the strength of one’s memories—and Control—using those judgments to guide behaviour (in particular, to guide study choices). Dunlosky, Serra, and Baker (2007) covered this distinction in a review of metamemory research that focused on how findings from this domain can be applied to other areas of applied research. In the domain of cognitive neuroscience, metacognitive monitoring and control has been viewed as a function of the prefrontal cortex, which receives (monitors) sensory signals from other cortical regions and implements control using feedback loops (see chapters by Shimamura,and Bacon, in Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008).

 

Postscript:

 

Attitudes as a function of social metacognition The way that individuals think about attitude greatly affects the way that they behave. Metacognitions about attitudes influence how individuals act, and especially how they interact with others. Some metacognitive characteristics of attitudes include importance, certainty, and perceived knowledge, and they influence behaviour in different ways. Attitude importance is the strongest predictor of behaviour and can predict information seeking behaviours in individuals. Attitude importance is also more likely to influence behaviour than certainty of the attitude. When considering a social behaviour like voting a person may hold high importance but low certainty. This means that they will likely vote, even if they are unsure whom to vote for. Meanwhile, a person who is very certain of who they want to vote for, may not actually vote if it is of low importance to them. This also applies to interpersonal relationships. A person might hold a lot of favourable knowledge about their family, but they may not maintain close relations with their family if it is of low importance. Metacognitive characteristics of attitudes may be key to understanding how attitudes change. Research shows that the frequency of positive or negative thoughts is the biggest factor in attitude change. A person may believe that climate change is occurring but have negative thoughts toward it such as “If I accept the responsibilities of climate change, I must change my lifestyle”. These individuals would not likely change their behaviour compared to someone that thinks positively about the same issue such as “By using less electricity, I will be helping the planet”. Another way to increase the likelihood of behaviour change is by influencing the source of the attitude. An individual’s personal thoughts and ideas have a much greater impact on the attitude compared to ideas of others. Therefore, when people view lifestyle changes as coming from themselves, the effects are more powerful than if the changes were coming from a friend or family member. These thoughts can be re-framed in a way that emphasizes personal importance, such as “I want to stop smoking because it is important to me” rather than “quitting smoking is important to my family”. More research needs to be conducted on culture differences and importance of group ideology, which may alter these results.

 

 

 

History of Cognition The Philosophy Café Bibliography

 

 

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Arminen, I., & Simonen, M. (2021). Expertise as a domain in interaction. Discourse Studies, 23(5), 577–596. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27130793

 

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Bates, D. (2013). Cartesian Robotics. Representations, 124(1), 43–68. https://doi.org/10.1525/rep.2013.124.1.43

 

Bengson, J. (2016). Practical Perception and Intelligent Action. Philosophical Issues, 26, 25–58. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26611228

 

Bloor, D. (1996). Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge. Social Studies of Science, 26(4), 839–856. http://www.jstor.org/stable/285663

 

Bob, P. (2009). Quantum Science and the Nature of Mind. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 30(1/2), 1–14. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43854233

 

Bruneau, T. (2012). Chronemics: Time-Binding and The Construction of Personal Time. ETC: A Review of General Semantics, 69(1), 72–92. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42579170

 

Caro, I. (2004). General Semantics Theory: Its Implications For Psychotherapy. ETC: A Review of General Semantics, 61(3), 308–326. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42578430

 

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Carter, M. (1990). The Idea of Expertise: An Exploration of Cognitive and Social Dimensions of Writing. College Composition and Communication, 41(3), 265–286. https://doi.org/10.2307/357655

 

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Colapietro, V. M. (2021). Human Emotions and Fallible Judgments: A Pragmatist Sketch of Cognitivism. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 35(3), 289–303. https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.35.3.0289

 

Copp, D. (2018). A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(3/4), 569–591. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48547713

 

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Cummings, C. (2015). Engaging New College Students in Metacognition for Critical Thinking: A Developmental Education Perspective. Research and Teaching in Developmental Education, 32(1), 68–71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44290289

 

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Demetriou, A., Makris, N., Spanoudis, G., Kazi, S., Shayer, M., & Kazali, E. (2018). Mapping the Dimensions of General Intelligence: An Integrated Dierential-Developmental Theory. Human Development, 61(1), 4–42. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26765191

 

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Dunlosky, J., Serra, M. J., & Baker, J. M. C. (2007). Metamemory. In F. T. Durso, R. S. Nickerson, S. T. Dumais, S. Lewandowsky, & T. J. Perfect (Eds.), Handbook of applied cognition (2nd ed., pp. 137–160). John Wiley & Sons, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470713181.ch6

 

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Flavell, J. H. (1982). On Cognitive Development. Child Development, 53(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.2307/1129634

 

Flavell, J. H., Green, F. L., & Flavell, E. R. (1989). Young Children’s Ability to Dierentiate Appearance-Reality and Level 2 Perspectives in the Tactile Modality. Child Development, 60(1), 201–213. https://doi.org/10.2307/1131085

 

Flavell, J. H. (1996). Piaget’s Legacy. Psychological Science, 7(4), 200–203. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40062945

 

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Neville Buch (Pronounced Book) Ph.D. is a certified member of the Professional Historians Association (Queensland). Since 2010 he has operated a sole trade business in history consultancy. He was a Q ANZAC 100 Fellow 2014-2015 at the State Library of Queensland. Dr Buch was the PHA (Qld) e-Bulletin, the monthly state association’s electronic publication, and was a member of its Management Committee. He is the Managing Director of the Brisbane Southside History Network.
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